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UNDEMOCRATIC CRIMES 
 




 One might assume that in a working democracy the criminal law rules 
would reflect the community’s shared judgments regarding justice and 
punishment. This is especially true because social science research shows that lay 
people generally think about criminal liability and punishment in consistent ways: 
in terms of desert, doing justice and avoiding injustice. Moreover, there are 
compelling arguments for demanding consistency between community views and 
criminal law rules based upon the importance of democratic values, effective 
crime-control, and the deontological value of justice itself. 
 It may then come as a surprise, and a disappointment, that a wide range of 
common rules in modern criminal law seriously conflict with community justice 
judgments, including three strikes and other habitual offender statutes, abolition 
or narrowing of the insanity defense, adult prosecution of juveniles, felony 
murder, strict liability offenses, and a variety of other common doctrines. 
 In short, democratically elected legislatures have regularly chosen to 
adopt criminal law rules that conflict with the deep and abiding intuitions of their 
constituents. We endeavor to explain how this incongruent situation has arisen. 
Using the legislative and political histories of the doctrines noted above, we 
document four common causes: legislative mistake about the community’s justice 
judgments, interest group pressure, prioritizing coercive crime-control 
mechanisms of general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous over 
doing justice, usually at the urging of academics or other experts, and legislative 
preference for delegating some criminalization decisions to other system actors, 
such as prosecutors and judges.  
 Analysis of these reasons and their dynamics suggests specific reforms, 
including a legislative commitment to reliably determine community justice 
judgments before enactment and to publicly explain the reasons for enacting any 
criminal law rule that conflicts. Creation of a standing criminal law reform 
commission would be useful to oversee the social science research and to help 
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 One might assume that in a working democracy the statutes governing criminal liability 
and punishment reflect community judgments of what is fair and just. Empirical studies show 
that ordinary people expect that their “criminal justice” system seeks to do justice and avoid 
injustice. As we discuss in Part II, the intelligentsia, be they consequentialists or retributivists, 
ought to join in this popular desire for doing justice. The consequentialists ought to see that the 
criminal law’s regular conflicts with community justice judgments undermine its moral 
credibility with the community and thereby its crime-control effectiveness. The retributivists 
ought to see that, given the practical impossibilities of operationalizing desert as an organizing 
principle for criminal code drafting, tracking community judgments of justice, so called 
“empirical desert,” provides what may be the best available approximation of the demands of 
‘transcendent’ justice.  
 Thus, it may come as a surprise to many that in fact a wide variety of current criminal 
law rules seriously conflict with community justice judgments, including three strikes and other 
habitual offender statutes, the adult prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the 
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insanity defense, felony murder, the use of strict liability offenses, and other criminal law rules. 
Part III reviews the empirical studies that show the conflict between these and community views. 
 In short, democratically elected legislatures have regularly chosen to adopt criminal law 
rules that conflict with the deep and abiding intuitions of their constituents. In Part IV, we 
endeavor to explain how this incongruent situation has arisen. Our examination of the legislative 
record reveals that such conflicts typically come about for any of four reasons: first, the 
legislators are simply ignorant of the conflict, and presumably would be surprised by the 
controlled empirical studies that reveal it. Second, special interest groups pressure legislators to 
adopt a rule that conflicts with community views but benefits the interest group. Third, 
legislators are persuaded, usually by academics and other supposed experts, that they should 
prioritize coercive crime-control over doing justice, which commonly means focusing on 
maximizing general deterrence or the incapacitation of dangerous offenders, even at the cost of 
unjust results. Or, fourth, legislators seek to avoid providing a clear rule–perhaps because it 
means facing controversy–by adopting a rule that essentially delegates criminal law rulemaking 
to others in the criminal justice system. For reasons we discuss in Part II, consequentialists, 
retributivists, and anyone committed to robust democratic values ought to be opposed to these 
legislative practices that create regular conflicts with community justice judgments. 
 Legislators are not condemned to continue their current practices, although clearly there 
are significant pressures in the current political system that may resist change. We suggest a 
number of reforms that we believe are realistic. First, we suggest that legislatures publicly 
commit themselves to find out if proposed legislation conflicts with community justice 
judgments before they legislate, by looking to controlled empirical studies rather than their own 
hunch, the representations of special interest groups, or the view that has the loudest media 
presentation. Second, where the proposed legislation does conflict with community justice 
judgments, the legislature ought to formally commit itself to give a public explanation as to why 
such a rule ought to be enacted. These two requirements together may have the effect of 
deterring many unjust and undemocratic legislative proposals, or at least limiting their scope. It 
would also help minimize the damage to the criminal justice system’s moral credibility by 
providing a public explanation for any conflict rule. Third, given the political pressures against 
any change in the current system, the legislature ought to create an independent standing 
criminal law reform commission that can undertake the needed empirical studies and act as a 
brace against legislative backsliding on its commitment to publicize and explain proposed 
criminal law rules that conflict with community justice judgments. 
 
II. Why the Substantive Criminal Law Ought to Reflect the 
Community’s Justice Judgments 
  
 James Wilson, speaking in 1791, predicted that the recently ratified United States 
constitution would ensure “the voice of the representatives will be the faithful echo of the voice 
of the people” in the new Republic.1 This prediction hits rough going when one considers 
contemporary criminal law. Too often, modern legislatures claim to be acting as the echo of their 
constituents’ voices in matters of criminal justice, while in reality contradicting the community’s 
deep and abiding value judgments.  
 We know from empirical studies that ordinary people believe that criminal liability and 
punishment ought to be distributed in a way that is deserved and just.2 They do not think in terms 
of general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous, as many academic consequentialists do. 
Nor are they able, or inclined, to give step-by-step rational analyses for why a particular criminal 
 
1 James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Collected Works 1 at 723. 
2  See generally Robinson, In Defense of Moral Credibility [forthcoming]. 
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law rule or principle and its results are just or unjust, as a retributivist would. But we argue here 
that both consequentialists and retributivists have good reason to support a criminal law that 
generally tracks community justice judgments.  
 Moreover, we believe that there are political values that demand consistency between 
criminal law rules and popular judgment—values of democracy that transcend particular theories 
of criminal punishment. It is those values we consider first.  
  
A. Democratic Values 
 
 A democratic state’s criminal law ought to institutionalize the community’s judgments 
about blameworthiness and punishment. This proposition flows from a demand that our 
democracy means more than mere electoral participation: it must mean that the People’s law 
reflects the People’s values. This substantive requirement is what we mean when we speak of 
criminal law “democratization.” 
 Democratizing the criminal law has been the subject of much recent discussion,3 which 
we regard as a laudable development. But the discussion thus far has focused too much on 
criminal procedure, to the point that talk of democratizing the substantive criminal law is 
eclipsed. This focus makes some sense, as citizen participation in American criminal justice is 
most salient in the jury, while the reasons to democratize the substantive law might seem less 
unique to criminal law; such reasons are apt to blend into more general arguments in the political 
authority literature regarding the merits of popular democracy.4 That said, there are strong 
arguments for democratization that are uniquely connected to crime and punishment. Making 
that case will be the work of Part II.B, while this sub-section takes up the challenge of justifying 
substantive democratization based on broad democratic values.5  
 Too much recent work on criminal law democratization has sought to either: (1) reduce 
the influence of popular sentiment on lawmaking; or (2) more radically, sought to displace it 
wholesale with control by bureaucratic elites.6 Writers in these camps contend that the criminal 
law will remain “democratic” so long as citizens continue to participate in elections (thus acting 
as an accountability check on the government), even if the law ultimately passed is not consonant 
with the popular “will” on specific issues.7  
 In stark contrast is the work of Joshua Kleinfeld, who has persuasively argued that “in a 
democratic society, law and other exercises of governmental power should reflect and respond to 
the ethical life of the people living under that law and government.”8 He defines “ethical life” as 
“the values disclosed by a community’s public deliberations or implicit in its social practices and 
 
3 See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld et al., White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1693, 1706 
(2017), Symposium, Democratizing Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017), Jocelyn Simonson, The Place 
of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 297 (2019), John Rappaport, Some Doubts 
About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (May, 2020). 
4 Or perhaps some authors still labor under the mistaken belief that the content of the criminal law in the United States 
already reflects the views of the citizenry, that our law is harsh and brutish because we are harsh and brutish. But this 
is not the case. See infra Pt. III.  
5 Caveat: this paper is not primarily meant to be an exercise in political theory. This discussion, therefore, will be 
highly compressed. But, it is a necessary foundation for the arguments and research that will follow.  
6 For the former see, e.g., Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 427 (2002)for the 
latter, see, e.g., Zimring, . Public Opinion and the Governance of Punishment in Democratic Political Systems. 605 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2019). 
7 Consider, for example, Pettit’s use of the federal reserve model for a penal policy board. Pettit, Is Criminal Justice 
Politically Feasible?, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 427 (2002) 
8 Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW U L Rev 1455, 1468. In this essay, Professor 
Kleinfeld also tees up what will be the primary focus of Part IV: “Why American government, despite a system of 
elected representatives, establishes such laws [conflicting with popular judgment] is an interesting question to ponder 
. . . .” 
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institutions.”9 Drawing on and critiquing the work of Jürgen Habermas, Max Weber, and de 
Tocqueville, Kleinfeld argues that electoral participation and the advancement of liberal values 
are “facets” of democracy, but he insists that democracy must be understood to also embrace 
what he calls “the authorial ideal”: that the law must be “by the People,” as Lincoln put it. This 
places a further condition on democracy: that the People be able to see themselves as the authors 
of the law, that they be capable of identifying their individual wills with the general will.10 This 
condition cashes out in a requirement that the judgments of the community about 
blameworthiness be reflected in the criminal law’s substantive rules.  
 The authorial ideal applies to the law generally. For example, it would be a problem for a 
state’s democratic credentials if its contract law was radically inconsistent with lay promising 
practices. But what is unique about criminal law is that ordinary people have such 
comprehensive and nuanced intuitive judgments here—judgments that can be rendered explicit 
via social psychology research techniques. Indeed, persons of very different backgrounds possess 
remarkably consistent views on a wide array of criminal law issues, including fundamental 
normative questions (for example, whether the criminal law ought to be primarily aimed at doing 
justice or avoiding future crime).11 This fact differentiates criminal law from many other fields, 
where citizens lack comprehensive intuitions. This observation implies that the degree of 
democratic illegitimacy is uniquely egregious when the criminal law departs from shared lay 
justice judgments. When this occurs, the state thumbs its nose at the judgments of the 
overwhelming majority of the community, thus threatening the state’s legitimacy.12   
 Returning to Kleinfeld’s arguments, it is important to understand exactly how his position 
(and ours) clashes with that of the anti-democratizers. Kleinfeld resists: (1) the impulse to 
replace the “democratic project of self-rule” with a substantive set of political values; (2) the 
notion that elections alone are enough; and (3) the “rationalizing orientation” of Habermasian 
democratic theorizing. To expand on this last point: one approach would determine the will of a 
community by hypothesizing about what outcome would be generated under idealized 
deliberative conditions. This hypothetical consensus is then substituted for actual deliberative 
results, as the more “rational” and “democratic” outcome—threatening to turn democracy into 
“what the theorist imagines to be the best reasons rather than the rule of the people.”13 Kleinfeld 
sees this whole move as “a mistake of the first order.”14  
 We agree with Kleinfeld’s conception of democracy as applied to the criminal law–the 
ability of a free people to see itself as the author of the criminal law is necessary for a state to be 
“democratic.” This authorial view is possible only if the law reflects the normative judgments of 
 
9 Id. Note the similarity between Kleinfeld’s idea of ethical life as disclosed by social practices and institutions, to our 
lay justice judgments. To us, these are fundamentally the same idea. Kleinfeld would look to the fact that a large 
majority of the population has, say, used marijuana, and conclude that the community does not judge such behavior 
to be morally blameworthy. We extract the same sort of result via social science experiments, which allow us to probe 
peoples’ intuitions about justice.  
10 See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, Victor Gourevitch (ed. and 
trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 (explicating the idea of the general will). 
11 Paul Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law, 111 Northwestern L. Rev 1565 (concluding that ordinary people’s 
views are rooted in “principles of proportionality” and conflict with academic-utilitarian crime-control doctrines). 
12 Consider the relative salience of crime in the media compared to say, contract disputes, or civil securities 
enforcement. Even assuming that people have strong intuitive judgments about these non-criminal matters, it remains 
the case that the criminal law’s divergence from ordinary people’s beliefs will be put in their faces in an especially 
forceful manner.  
13 Kleinfeld, Three Principles, 1470. One sees such a view in the background of Pettit’s proposal for a Penal Policy 
Board. Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible? His Board is a recreation of society in miniature, in which a 
combination of predominating expert opinion and insulation from public deliberations will produce more ‘rational’ 
recommendations for the criminal law. Rather than hypothesizing about what would result from an idealized 
deliberative process, Pettit would have us create such an idealized setting ‘in a bottle’ and then implement the results. 
14 Id. at 1470. 
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the community. The stakes for legitimacy are particularly high respecting criminal law and 
currently the United States is radically deficient when judged against this ideal.  
 
B. Theories of Punishment 
 
 Although general political values do provide persuasive support for the criminal law 
democratization project, we nonetheless recognize that reasons stemming from within 
punishment theory will likely be more convincing—as reasons most closely related to criminal 
law. Moreover, we contend that both consequentialism and retributivism generate pro-
democratization arguments. It is to those arguments to which we now turn. 
 
 1. Consequentialism:  Coercive Crime-Control  
 
 At first blush, one would not expect the proverbial “good utilitarian” to care whether the 
justice system’s rules reflect community judgments or not. On her view, there exists an ideal set 
of liability rules and corresponding punishments (contingent on time and place) which maximize 
utility through crime control; the primary mechanisms of control being deterrence and/or 
incapacitation of the dangerous. If the community agrees that the law does ‘transcendent’ justice, 
then that’s ideal, but their approval is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for determining 
what the rules ought to be.15 Indeed, our good utilitarian is likely to be affirmatively hostile to 
the views of ordinary people—to view them as primitive and vengeful, as targets to be 
undermined through surreptitious means or explicitly by ‘enlightening’ education.  
 That said, democracy as a political system could tempt the good utilitarian, for that 
system may provide a desirable decision-procedure for determining the law in general. 
Instrumentalist arguments for democracy exist16 and they sometimes argue that the laws of the 
democratic state will on balance be superior to those of the non-democratic state. This could be 
so for a variety of reasons–that democracy forces rulers to consider the interests of a wider set of 
persons, for example. But such arguments are naturally subject to falsification and the relevant 
data set (the history of modern mass democracies) is arguably too small to draw firm conclusions 
about the superiority of democracy (assuming we disregard non-consequentialist values). And 
there are instrumentalist arguments against democracy too, from the likes of Plato and Hobbes.17  
 
15 Perhaps community views only enter the approach insofar as the pragmatic utilitarian recognizes that the 
thoroughgoing retributivism of ordinary people limits the rules that are practically feasible in a political sense, but 
that is all. See Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, in 40 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 193, 233-34 (Mark Zanna ed., 2008) (presenting empirical 
study showing that people primarily react to crime descriptions emotionally and favor proportional just deserts, and 
noting that “[c]ontempt will develop when the sentencing practices of the society are importantly out of synchrony 
with the citizens’ rank orderings of the blameworthiness of crimes”); Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul 
H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOCIAL PSYCH.. 284, 295 (2002) (presenting empirical study demonstrating that people assess punishment based 
upon desert criterion, rather than upon factors relevant to deterrence); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul 
H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) 
(presenting empirical studies finding that people assess punishment based upon desert criterion, rather than upon 
factors relevant to dangerousness) 
16 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Representative Government (1861) (“…it is evident that the only 
government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; 
that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should every where be as 
great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately 
desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state.”). 
17 See, e.g., Plato, Republic (trans. Jowett) (“The [democratic] State demands the strong wine of freedom, and unless 
her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them; equality and fraternity of governors and governed 




 Moreover, even the democratic utilitarian could believe that criminal law is an exception 
where the experts ought to rule. Criminal law democratization comes in many flavors and one 
could be a “democrat” while being far from a “populist.”18 At an extreme edge we could locate 
the view that community judgment ought to actively determine specific case outcomes (imagine 
an online poll being held to determine guilt, sentence, etc., of particular offenders). To our 
knowledge, no writer supports such a position.  
 Further, any consequentialist would still be free to believe that the generally-preferable 
democratic procedure has gotten the rule wrong in a particular instance. Democratic 
determination might usually be the best decision procedure, but that superiority could be a close-
run thing, leaving open the option of consistent elite interference in democratically-ordained 
outcomes, or at least elite campaigns to try to “enlighten” the masses to the desirability of 
alternative criminal law rules.  
 So far then, it would seem that the good utilitarian has not been converted to the 
democratization cause. The arguments for democratizing either rely on non-instrumentalist 
values like equality of liberty–which the true consequentialist will not care about in isolation–or 
they establish only that democracy ought to play some limited role in determining the criminal 
law. But there is another extant consequentialist argument, one which does not involve appeal to 
deontic values, and yet which can justify thoroughgoing democratization.  
 
 2.  Consequentialism: Empirical Desert’s Normative Crime Control  
 
 One of us has argued elsewhere that a good utilitarian has impeccable consequentialist 
reasons to support criminal law democratization: without a criminal law that reflects the 
community’s judgments of justice, crime control is hobbled.  
 Setting aside the accumulating evidence that general deterrence and incapacitation of the 
dangerous may be effective crime control distributive principles in principle but not in practice,19 
recent research suggests that crime-control effectiveness depends in some significant part upon 
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community. A criminal justice system with a good 
reputation for reliably doing justice and avoiding injustice is one that will inspire cooperation, 
support, deference, and the internalization of its norms. In contrast, a criminal justice system that 
earns a reputation for deviating from the community’s principles of justice–deviating, that is, 
from “empirical desert”–is a system that will inspire resistance and subversion and will lose the 
ability to harness the powerful forces of social influence and internalized norms.20 In short, 
effective crime control requires moral credibility which, in turn, requires democratization. 
 It is easy to see this principle at work on a large scale anecdotally. Consider the 
Prohibition Era in the United States. When even government officials openly ignored the general 
ban on alcohol consumption, such public disrespect for the criminal law rule tended to reinforce 
people’s disillusionment with the criminal law generally, which in turn promoted greater 
community violation. And the disillusionment tainted not only the alcohol prohibition rules, but 
also reduced compliance with criminal law rules unrelated to alcohol.21 
 
18 See, e.g., Jose Luis Marti, The Republican Democratization of Criminal Law and Justice,  In Samantha Besson & 
José Luis Martí (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives. Oxford University Press 
(2009).  
19  See Paul H. Robinson, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) chs. 3-6; Paul H. Robinson and Lindsay Holcomb, In Defense of Moral Credibility 
(forthcoming 2021). 
20 For a summary of the supporting arguments and a response to criticisms, see Robinson and Holcomb, In Defense 
of Moral Credibility (forthcoming 2021). 




 An analogous dynamic can be seen in the so-called ‘Watts Riots’ of 1965. In the 1960s 
Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, where violations of the criminal law were increasingly met 
with charges and sentences that seemed to residents grossly disproportionate, the aggressive 
policing and punishment did not reduce crime, as intended, but rather increased it, as the criminal 
law’s credibility within the neighborhood progressively weakened. In August 1965, this tension 
came to a boiling point, after a Watts resident’s violent encounter with the police inspired the 
community to take to the streets. An official investigation of the Watts riots conducted by the 
California Governor found that the riot was a result of the Watts community’s long-simmering 
grievances and discontent with criminal law enforcement.22 
 But one need not rely simply on common sense and anecdotal evidence to see the 
disillusionment-lawlessness connection. The dynamic is confirmed by controlled social 
psychology studies. The research suggests that the relationship between moral credibility, on the 
one hand, and community deference and compliance, on the other, is widespread and nuanced. 
Even small incremental losses in moral credibility can produce corresponding incremental losses 
in deference and compliance.23  
 Consider, for example, a study using a within-subjects design in which subjects were 
asked a number of questions relating to various ways in which moral credibility is thought to 
affect deference, compliance, and the internalization of the law’s norms. Will a citizen assist 
police by reporting a crime? Will they assist in the investigation and prosecution of a crime? Do 
people take the imposition of criminal liability and punishment as a reliable sign that the 
defendant has done something truly condemnable? Do people take the extent of the liability 
imposed as a reliable indication of the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the 
offender? With a baseline established on these and related issues, subjects were then 
disillusioned by exposing them to accounts of the system’s failures of justice and doing of 
injustice. Later retesting showed that the measures of deference, compliance, and internalization 
of norms had all decreased.24  
 A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different levels of 
disillusionment to three different groups and then testing their levels of deference, compliance, 
and internalization.25 The results confirm the conclusions of the earlier within-subjects design. 
The greater the disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance, and internalization. 
A study analyzing responses in pre-existing large datasets came to a similar conclusion using 
regression analysis.26  
 The results in the laboratory studies are particularly striking because subjects come to the 
study with pre-existing views on the system’s reputation for being just. The experimenters, 
within the context of the study, could only nudge those pre-existing views slightly. Yet even that 
incremental disillusionment produced corresponding incremental reductions in deference and 
compliance. This is a particularly important finding because it means that no matter what the 
current state of a criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community, any 
incremental reduction in credibility can produce an incremental reduction in deference–and any 
increase can produce an increase in deference. 
 Empirical desert–and its resulting moral credibility–thus provides a powerful, 
consequentialist rationale for the democratization of the criminal law. This moral credibility 
argument for democratization does not involve appeal to deontic values. You don’t have to 
believe that liberty or equality (let alone desert) are values independent of utility to buy empirical 
desert’s democratization rationale. Nor need you believe that the community’s view has any 
 
22 See generally Watts Riots (http://crdl.usg.edu/events/watts_riots/?Welcome). 
23 See Robinson (2013); Robinson, Goodwin & Reisig (2010) 
24 See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert, ch. 2 (2013). 
25 Id. 
26 See Robinson Goodwin and Reisig, Disutility of Injustice, 85 NYU L. Rev. 1940, 2021-23 (2010). 
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special moral or epistemic status; that is, you do not have to think that a proposition is entitled to 
become law solely on account of public support, or that the public is particularly good at 
deciding what the “true” propositions of morality are. All that matters is the recognition of the 
moral credibility equals increased compliance equation. The specific content of the community’s 
views fades into the backdrop, and what remains is the synergistic relation between what they 
believe is right and what the law commands. 
 Of course, none of this is to say that there are only consequentialist reasons for 
democratization; other rationales proceed from radically different premises but—we argue—
converge on similar conclusions. 
 
 3. Retributivism 
 
 The committed retributivist has good reason to be a democratizer about criminal law–
indeed, they might already be one without knowing it. 
 First, one of us has argued that, given the impracticality of implementing a retributivist 
criminal code, codifying the community’s judgments ought to be the retributivist’s immediate 
goal, as the closest she can come to implementing her system.27 The pragmatic obstacles to 
implementing retributivism were on display during the drafting of the United States Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines, with Stephen Breyer stating in the aftermath that “some students of the 
criminal justice system strenuously urged the Commission to follow what they call a ‘just 
deserts’ approach to punishment. . . . The difficulty that arises in applying this approach is that 
different Commissioners have different views about the correct rank order of the seriousness of 
different crimes.”28 This dissension within the Commission reflects perennial controversies in 
philosophical discourse. The relevance of resulting harm to deserved punishment is perhaps the 
most notorious such issue. Not only is it a necessary question that any criminal code must 
answer, but by the numbers philosophers appear consistently split on the issue.29 There is no 
principled basis from within retributivism to determine which view should be codified because 
the disagreement is precisely about what retributivism entails. 
 It is not just that some moral philosophers will disagree about almost any issue. The 
problem is that there is no mechanism consistent with the reason-analysis mantra of retributivism 
to resolve those disputes in a principled way, as a criminal code drafter or a sentencing 
guidelines drafter must. Reverting to voting within some specified group, be it the drafting 
commission, the legislators, or moral philosophers, is a violation of retributivism’s commitment 
to rational analysis alone. 
 Luckily for the retributivist, there may be a solution: codifying the community’s 
judgments is a principle that can be used to generate a criminal code without infinite normative 
regress (thus satisfying the condition of practicability) and which would give rise to a code that is 
(by-and-large) retributivist, in the sense that its provisions will mostly match those of the 
majority view among academic retributivists. It clearly is not ‘true’ retributivism, but it may be 
the best practical approximation of it that is possible. 
The resulting code would be a good approximation of a retributivist code because 
ordinary people base their liability and punishment judgments on conceptions of desert, as we 
 
27 See Robinson, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES 165-74. 
28. Breyer, Stephen (1988) "The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest," 
Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 17 : Iss. 1 , Article 1 at 15. He also complained that any desert-oriented system would 
lack objectivity. Id. at 16. 
29 See Harm Matters: Punishing Failed Attempts, 14 Oh. St. J. Crim. L. 629, n. 1, n. 2 (2017) (listing thinkers in the 
two camps). And even on less controversial questions there are almost always dissenters from the consensus. Some 
philosophers believe that punishment is never justified, as moral responsibility is a fiction. See, e.g., Bruno Waller, 
THE INJUSTICE OF PUNISHMENT (2017).  
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noted above.30 The empirical research bears out this generalization. For example, a number of 
studies have examined what is commonly referred to as the “innate retribution hypothesis” or the 
idea that most people make punishment decisions on a retributivist basis, finding, ultimately, that 
people are sensitive to the gravity of the wrong and the degree of blameworthiness of the 
wrongdoer, rather than what can be achieved through punishment. In one study, researchers 
found that people are intuitively drawn to retribution-related information.31 In that study, 
subjects were given vignettes of crime and were presented with different categories of 
information about that crime–some with a retributive bent, some with a deterrence bent, and 
some with an incapacitation bent.32 A whopping 97 percent of subjects chose to consult 
retribution-related information on a first trial rather deterrence-related information or 
incapacitation-related information.33 When, on a second survey, the same subjects were asked to 
sentence the offender in question and rate the confidence of their choices, those who had 
consulted retributive materials were substantially more confident in their sentencing decisions, 
while those who consulted utilitarian materials exhibited far less confidence, possibly indicating 
that they believed they had made poor choices.34  
Empirical studies also tell us that people largely agree about the relative blameworthiness 
of hypothetical criminal cases—as well as on the factors that increase and decrease offender 
blameworthiness. On many issues, there is in fact a high degree of agreement across 
demographics on the relative blameworthiness of specific wrongdoers. Many of these areas of 
high agreement might be called the “core of wrongdoing” because they concern such 
fundamental offenses as physical injury to others, taking property without consent, and deceit in 
exchanges. Consider one study that had subjects rank order 24 scenarios according to overall 
deserved punishment.35 The kinds of offenses in the scenarios represent 94.9% of the offenses 
committed in the United States. The results show a Kendall’s W of 0.95 for in-person subjects 
and 0.88 for Internet subjects—an astounding result. One can’t normally get this level of 
agreement except in observational studies, as with asking subjects to judge the relative brightness 
of dot clusters. 
This pervasive public agreement is critical; it means that our hypothetical criminal code 
drafter will  not commonly encounter normative dilemmas on which the community is really 
split, and thus he will have little occasion to make a contestable normative judgment in designing 
the code.  
 In sum, the retributivist has good reason to support democratization of the criminal law. 
That approach holds out the best prospect for implementing a more deontologically just criminal 
code, in which offender blameworthiness is central, as opposed to utilitarian crime control. 
  
III. Criminal Law Conflicts with Community Views 
 
Although criminal codes in the United States are promulgated by elected legislators, the 
law often diverges from the judgments of the electors. This problem is not limited to archaic or 
rarely invoked code provisions; it effects doctrines as commonplace (and serious) as felony 
 
30 See also Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley & Paul Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 284, 284 (2002); John Darley, Kevin Carlsmith, 
and Paul Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 
659(2000 
31 Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCH. 437 (2006). 
32 Id. at 440. 
33 Id. at 445. 
34 Id. at 446. 
35 Robinson and Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, at 1846-80; IJUD Chapter 2. 
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murder and the insanity defense, doctrines that can mean the difference between life and death 
for a criminal defendant.   
 Below, we make good on this undemocratic diagnosis, surveying compelling evidence 
that a variety of pervasive criminal law doctrines are in tension with the views of the 
communities they apply to. Our presentation here is not meant to be comprehensive. Its main 
objective is to provide examples for use in the next analytical step—determining why this 
undemocratic regime exists.36  
 
A. Abolition or Narrowing of the Insanity Defense 
 
 Abolition of the insanity defense was a highlight of the Supreme Court’s docket recently, 
in Kahler v. Kansas.37 The Court considered and upheld Kansas’s decision to eliminate a 
defendant’s madness-induced “moral incapacity” as a defense; state law instead allows only that 
“[i]t shall be a defense to a prosecution … that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or 
defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the offense charged.”38 Four 
other states follow a  similar doctrine, termed the mens rea approach.39 That approach is the 
most extreme attack on the insanity defense extant in American law.40  
However, there are other, less extreme limitations on the defense on the books too. Down 
one notch from the mens rea approach, thirty states forbid the presentation of evidence that 
would demonstrate a defendant suffered from a “control dysfunction,” allowing only evidence 
going to cognition defects.41 These departures from the “M’Naghten plus control” test, and the 
A.L.I.’s similar two-prong test, both seriously conflict with lay views. 
 The available evidence suggests that lay people hold mentally ill offenders blameless 
when they either do not understand the criminality of their conduct or, if they do understand it, 
have a substantially impaired capacity to control themselves. In one study, for example, the vast 
majority of subjects (66% to 92%, depending upon the facts of the case) imposed no liability in 
such cases, and even those who did impose liability significantly mitigated the punishment, even 
for a serious offense.42 If lay intuitions of justice are taken as the yardstick for insanity defense 
law, then most current American variants are woefully wanting. Other studies confirm this 
result.43 
 
B. Three-Strikes and Other Habitual Offender Statutes 
 
In August 2020, national news outlets picked up a disturbing story of criminal sentencing 
run amok: “Black man serving life sentence for stealing hedge clippers getting shot at 
 
36 Readers keen to dig deeper into the relevant evidence regarding code-community conflicts are encouraged to 
consult: Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1995).  
37See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1031 (2020).  
38 Id. at 1025 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5209 (2018 Cum. Supp.) ) 
39 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-207 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-102 (2017); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (LexisNexis 
2017); Alaska Stat. §§ 12.47.010(a). 
40 We consider the MPC’s dual-prong substantial capacity doctrine to be the broadest variation available. 
41 See Robinson & Goodwin & Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, N.Y.U. L. Rev 1940, n. 57; see also Model Penal 
Code 4.01 (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease 
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law.”) (emphasis added)  
42 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, supra note 42, at 132 R tbl.5.2 (illustrating 




freedom.”44 The story concerned a Louisiana man named Fair Wayne Bryant, who was 
convicted in 1997 of attempting to steal a pair of hedge-clippers, and was subsequently given a 
life sentence under Louisiana’s habitual offender laws.45 In 2020, that sentence was upheld by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court.46 Bryant’s previous felonies spanned decades, including attempted 
armed robbery in 1979, possession of stolen items in 1987, attempted forgery of a check in 1989, 
and burglary in 1992.47 Cumulatively, these convictions made Bryant eligible for the life 
sentence imposed for the attempted theft--despite the fact that he had already served a ten year 
sentence at hard labor for his earlier robbery conviction.48 
 Dispositions like Bryant’s are hardly uncommon under America’s habitual offender 
sentencing regimes. So-called “three-strikes” laws are one of the most well-known examples of 
this phenomenon, but it comes in many shapes and sizes. South Carolina, for example, has a 
“two-strikes” law, under which a defendant shall receive a mandatory life sentence if they 
commit two offenses from an enumerated list of “most serious” crimes.49 In California, a 
defendant risks a life sentence by committing three non-violent offenses involving drugs and 
minors.50 We could list many more variants.51 Every state (as well as the federal system52) holds 
out the possibility of a life sentence for habitual offenders.  
 Despite the popularity of habitual offender statutes with American legislators, these laws 
do not reflect community views. The available studies suggest that people do see subsequent 
offenses as being slightly more blameworthy than equivalent first-time offenses, but that they do 
not support the extreme increases common in habitual offender statutes. For example, subjects 
given a survey in Ohio were asked whether they supported or opposed passing a “three strikes 
and you’re out” law in their jurisdiction. Of all respondents, 88.4% answered that they would 
support such a measure. The same set of subjects were then presented with a vignette, identified 
as a passage from a newspaper story, in which the story’s imaginary subject committed a serious 
felony after having committed two previous crimes in the state (the point being that under a 
three-strikes regime, the punishment would be life imprisonment). Respondents were asked to 
assign an appropriate punishment on a scale ranging from “no punishment at all” to “life in 
prison, with no possibility of being released.” Whereas true support for habitual-offender statutes 
would seem to predict a majority of answers in the “life in prison” range, only 16.9% of 
respondents gave this answer. More tellingly, only 11.1% of those who chose a sentence of less 
than thirty years in prison (a group that includes 86.4% of all subjects) had answered that they 
opposed three-strikes legislation. People’s true justice judgments simply did not match their 
reported views when asked about a politically-charged criminal justice policy.53 Other studies 
report the same conflict between community judgments and three strikes statutes.54 
 
 
44 Black man serving life sentence for stealing hedge clippers getting shot at freedom, CBS News,  
(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fair-wayne-bryant-bernette-johnson-black-man-life-sentence-stealing-hedge-
clippers-shot-at-freedom/) 
45Kay Jones and Leah Asmelash, Louisiana Supreme Court upholds Black man's life sentence for stealing hedge 
clippers more than 20 years ago, CNN (https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/06/us/louisiana-supreme-court-
trnd/index.html)  
46 Id.  
47 Louisiana v. Bryant, No. 2020-KO-00077 (2020) (https://www.lasc.org/Opinions/2020/20-0077.KO.bjj.dis.pdf) 
48 Id.  
49 See SC SECTION 17-25-45 (Life sentence for person convicted for certain crimes). 
50 CA HLTH & S § 11353 
51 See ROBINSON, MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES, Ch. 2. (2018). 
52 18 U.S.C. §  3559(c);  
53 Robinson, Disutility of Injustice, at 1940. 
54 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 189–97 (1995) (discussing theories and patterns of multiple-offense sentencing). 
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C. Adult Prosecution of Juveniles 
 
 At the close of the 1990s, all jurisdictions in the United States permitted juveniles to be 
transferred to criminal court and tried as adults.55 Transfers can be accomplished by a 
discretionary, presumptive, or mandatory waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, as well as by 
specific statutory criteria, and may be limited to specific offenses. The lowest age for which 
transfer is allowed differs by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions do not list any minimum age for 
transfer. Others explicitly allow transfer as early as age ten.  
 In recent years, however, one front in the broader movement to reduce the harshness of 
American criminal justice has focused on reforming juvenile prosecution procedures. So-called 
“raise the age” laws—which increase the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction—have 
been passed in many states, and continue to be considered in others.56 Some states have changed 
their laws regarding the minimum age for transfer to adult court, via “raise the floor” laws.57 
California, notably, has now ended the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds into adult court, making 
16 the minimum age for criminal court jurisdiction.58 Other states have explored various roll-
backs of the pro-transfer laws of the 1990s.59 
These reforms find support in lay intuitions of justice. The available studies suggest that 
people dramatically mitigate punishments for children, even for the most serious offenses. In one 
study, a youth was described as committing the horrific offense of pouring gasoline on a sleeping 
companion and setting him on fire. Although the offense generates high liability and punishment 
judgments when committed by an adult, it generated quite limited punishment when the offender 
was described as young: When the offender was described as fourteen years old, 23% of the 
subjects would impose no liability, and the average sentence was 5.4 years. When the offender 
was described as ten years old, 47% of the subjects would impose no liability, and the average 
liability was 11 months.60 Other studies report similar results.61 In sum, public attitudes towards 
juvenile criminal offenders are in fact consistent with, not a departure from, attitudes about 
juveniles in other contexts—in which their relative lack of capacity is accepted as a given. 
 
D. Felony Murder 
 
 The traditional felony-murder doctrine punishes as murder all deaths caused in the course 
of a felony--no matter how accidental the killing--and applies such murder liability to both the 
principal and to all accomplices in the underlying felony. The most popular version of the rule, 
used by forty jurisdictions, allows only inherently dangerous felonies (such as arson or drug 
 
55  Robinson, Disutility of Injustice, at 1953. 
56 See Report of the Justice Policy Institute, Raise the Age 
(http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/raisetheagesummary_final_3_6_16.pdf); see also 
National Conference of State Legislators, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws 
(https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-
laws.aspx). 
57 See Campaign for Youth Justice, State Trends Report (http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/A-
StateTrends_Report-Web.pdf). 
58 See Maureen Washburn, California’s Latest Adult Transfer Law Models Pathways for Reform for Rest of U.S., 
JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (https://jjie.org/2018/10/03/californias-latest-adult-transfer-law-
models-pathways-for-reform-for-rest-of-u-s/). 
59 See supra note 57. 
60 Robinson, Disutility of Injustice at 1977. 
61 See id. at 1977-78; see also Loretta Stalans and Gary Henry, (1994), Societal Views of Justice for Adolescents 
Accused of Murder, pg. 692, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499331; Sheryl Kubiak and Terrence Allen (2008), Public 




trafficking) to trigger the rule’s use.62 Ten jurisdictions allow the commission of any felony to be 
used.63 Two jurisdictions have abolished the felony murder rule.64 
 The available empirical evidence suggests that lay intuitions of justice do not support 
either the aggravation of culpability or the complicity aspect of the felony murder rule. In one 
study, for example, subjects aggravated culpability for an accidental killing during a felony, but 
only to the level of manslaughter, not murder.65 The accomplice in the felony is punished at an 
even lower level than manslaughter,66 reflecting a common tendency of people to discount the 
liability of accomplices even though the legal doctrine typically treats the two as having identical 
liability.67 Other studies have come to similar conclusions.68 
 
E. Strict Liability Offenses 
 
 It is now common for even serious offenses, like statutory rape, to be treated as strict 
liability offenses. Under such a regime, a culpable state of mind need not be proven with respect 
to a sexual partner’s age. Most jurisdictions reject even a reasonable mistake as to age as a 
defense to statutory rape.69 While other serious offenses, such as driving under the influence, can 
 
62 United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006); Alabama, Ala. Code § 13a-6-2(A)(3) (2009); Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 
11.41.110(A)(3) (2008); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(A)(2) (2010); California, Cal. Penal Code § 1-8-
1-189 (West 2008); Colorado, 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-102(1)(B) (West 2009); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53(A)-54(C) (West 
2007); District Of Columbia, D.C. Code § 22-2101 (Lexisnexis 2010); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (West 
2007); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4003(D) (2004); Illinois, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(A)(3) (West 2002); 
Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-2, -3 (West 2004); Iowa, Iowa Code § 707.2.2-.3 (2007); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-3401(B) (2007); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(1) (2007); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-A, § 
202(1) (2006); Maryland, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(A)(4) (Lexisnexis 2002); Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. 
Laws Ch. 265, § 1 (Lexisnexis 2008); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.316(1)(B) (West 2004); Minnesota, 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.185(A)(2)-(3) (West 2009); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(C) (2005); Montana, 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102(1)(B) (2009); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303(2) (2009); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
200.030(1)(B) (2009); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2c:11-3.A(3) (West 2005); New York, N.Y. Penal Law § 
125.25(3) (Consol. 1998); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-17 (West 2000); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. 
Code § 12.1-16-01(1)(C) (1997); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) (West 2006); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. § 
163.115(1)(B) (2009); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (2002); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-
20(C)(A)(1) (2003); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-4(1) (2006); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
202(A)(2)-(3) (2006); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(D) (Lexisnexis 2008); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13, § 
2301 (2009); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32 (2009); West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-2-1 (2005); 
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.03 (West 2005); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(A) (2009). 
63 Arkansas, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(A)(1) (2006); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 636(A)(2) (2007); 
Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1 (2007); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021.1(2) (1999); New Hampshire, N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1-B (2007); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1-A(2) (2004); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. 
Tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (West 2002); Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(B) (1998); Texas, Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(B)(3) (West 2003); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.32.030(1)(C), -.050(1)(B) 
(2009). 
64 Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-701 (1996); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (Lexisnexis 2008). 
65 See Robinson & Darley, Justice, Liability, And Blame, at 76.  
66 Id. at 180 (“[W]hile the [felony murder] doctrine treats the accomplice exactly like a 
murderer, the subjects impose liability somewhat less than they would for manslaughter.”). Id. at 180 (“[W]hile the 
[felony murder] doctrine treats the accomplice exactly like a murderer, the subjects impose liability somewhat less 
than they would for manslaughter.”). 
67 Id. at 36 tbl.2.9, 208-10 (dichotomous-continuous discussion). 
68 See Norman Finkel, 1990, Capital felony-murder, objective indicia, and community sentiment, pg. 876, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arz32&div=38&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journal
s). 
69 See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. 




be ones of strict liability,70 the bulk of strict liability offenses are more minor, such as “public 
welfare offenses,”71 speeding and other vehicular offenses, and liquor, narcotics, and food 
regulation infractions. A few state courts have invalidated the use of strict liability for offenses 
that impose significant prison sentences or create an unreasonable expectation of knowledge in 
the offender. The Model Penal Code attempts to restrict the use of strict liability to “violations” 
rather than crimes,72 although it too imposes strict liability for the serious felony of aggravated 
statutory rape.73 
Available research suggests that people generally do not impose criminal liability in the 
absence of some level of offender culpability. For example, in one study, offenders who made 
reasonable mistakes about whether a sexual partner was underage were given no punishment by 
88% of the subjects, with substantial mitigation of punishment by those few subjects who 
imposed any.74  
 
F. Drug Offense Penalties 
 
Although they are traditionally governed by state law, drug-related crimes have 
increasingly come under federal jurisdiction in recent decades.75 In an attempt to increase 
deterrent effects, federal sentencing for drug crimes has become quite harsh.76 The average 
federal sentence for drug-related crimes in 2005 was 85.7 months. If marijuana-related crimes 
are ignored, that average rises to 98.9 months. As a point of comparison, the average federal 
sentence for all violent crimes is 95.2 months. Homicide has an average sentence of 118.3 
months—less than 20% higher than the average sentence for nonmarijuana drug offenses.77 
Harsher federal penalties mean that an ever-increasing number of cases that could be brought in 
state courts are being prosecuted in federal court.78 
 The available empirical evidence suggests that, while many people see drug offenses as 
serious, they typically are not viewed as being nearly as blameworthy as current sentences would 
suggest. In one study, subjects ranked the offense of marijuana possession as a rather minor 
 
majority employing strict liability). For states that employ a strict liability approach, see, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 794.021 (West 2007), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2c:14-5(C) (West 2005), And Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.43(2) (West 2005). For 
States That Allow For A Mistake Defense, See, For Example, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(C) (Lexisnexis 2009), Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 566.020 (2000), And W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8B-12 (LexisNexis 2005). The federal approach is a hybrid, 
with strict liability only for sexual contact with children under the age of twelve. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2006). 
70 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (2004) (listing states where driving under the influence is treated as strict 
liability offense). 
71 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952) (comparing nature of “public welfare offenses,” 
which involve neglect or inaction with regard to duty of care, to accepted classifications of common law offenses, 
which involve “positive aggressions or invasions”) 
72 Model Penal Code section 2.05. 
73 Model Penal Code section 213.6(1). 
74 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, at 89 tbl.4.1 (showing respondents’ negligible 
imposition of punishment in light of negligent mistake). 130 See id. at 172-73 tbl.6.  
75 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug 
Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 259-60 (2000) (stating that since 1970s, Congress has expanded federal 
jurisdiction over drug crimes, and noting that “virtually any drug crime can now be prosecuted federally”). 
76 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines suggest 0 to 6 months for possession, and 0 months up to a maximum of 293 
months for possession with intent to manufacture, import, export, or traffic. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c), 2D2.1(a) (2006). 
77 All sentencing statistics are taken from: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defendants Sentenced 
in U.S. District Courts: By Offense, and Type and Length of Sentence, Fiscal Year 2005, in SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.5.25.2005, http:// www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5252005.pdf 
78 See Glaeser et al. at 260 (noting that expansion of federal jurisdiction and harsher federal penalties could implicate 
deterrence and equity considerations). 
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offense, comparable to, at most, a minor theft.79 Possession of cocaine was deemed a bit more 
serious but still only about as blameworthy as a slightly more serious theft.80 A conviction for 
dealing cocaine was seen as being considerably more blameworthy—more akin to breaking into 
a car or robbery.81 Importing cocaine was seen as more serious still, similar in seriousness to 
burglary or assault.82 Other studies come to similar conclusions.83 
 
F. Other Conflict Points 
 
 Here then are a number of common and highly visible criminal law rules that the 
evidence shows conflict with community justice judgments. This is hardly a comprehensive list 
of such code-community conflict points. Empirical research has shown similar conflicts for 
many other criminal law doctrines, including, for example, grading complicity equal to the 
principle offense,84 imputing recklessness to the voluntarily intoxicated,85 forbidding 
individualization of the reasonable person standard,86 forbidding a legal ignorance defense,87 
refusing to recognize a broad lesser-evils defense,88 the use of the substantial step test for attempt 
liability,89 and treating proximate cause and self-defense in all-or-nothing terms, rather than 
along graded continuums.90 Many other examples are possible.91 
 
IV. Why Do Legislatures Adopt Criminal Law Rules That Conflict with 
Community Justice Judgments? 
 
In Part III we examined several examples of conflict points in contemporary criminal 
law, that is, laws that are in tension with the normative intuitions of the lay public. We 
demonstrated exactly how out-of-step with lay intuitions these common doctrines are. We are 
now in a position to begin examining the question of why legislators in democratic polities (at 
both the state and federal levels) consistently pass laws that contradict the deep and consistent 
judgments of their constituents. It seems a genuinely puzzling situation. One might naturally 
conclude that the harshness of rules like “three strikes” reflects the harshness of the American 
 
79 Compare Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 88, at 1885 tbl.6 (illustrating mean rank R of 7.4 assigned to marijuana 
possession in Study 3), and id. at 1888 tbl.8 (illustrating mean rank of 2.2 assigned to marijuana possession in Study 
4), with id. at 1869 tbl.1 (showing mean rank of 6.8 assigned to short-changing in Study 1), and id. at 1876 tbl.3 
(showing no offense with mean rank comparable to 2.2 in Study 2). 
80 Id. at 1885. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. Note that the subjects in the study with the larger, more demographically diverse subject pool (Study 2) treated 
these four drug offenses as significantly less serious than those in the smaller, more narrow pool of Study 1. 
Compare the mean rankings found in Table 6 (Study 3) to those of Table 8 (Study 4), which suggests that the text 
here may overstate the seriousness with which the population generally sees drug offenses. Id. at 1885-88. 
83 See e.g. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY: PUBLIC OPINION ON 
SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 25 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/nss/jp_exsum. htm 
84 Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 263-264. 
85 Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 335. 
86 Justice, Liability, and Blame, 123. 
87 Adam Alter, Julia Kernochan, John Darley, Morality Influences How People Apply the Ignorance of the Law 
Defense, L. &. SOC. REV.  819, 846 (2007). 
88 Paul Robinson and John Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N. CAROLINA. L. REV. 1095, 
1131 (1998). 
89 Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 253. 
90 Erich Green and John Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect Causation on Judgements of Criminal 
Liability, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 429, 447 (1998); Intuitions of Justice, 281-2. 




people.92 Yet the social science research laid out above shows that such rules seriously conflict 
with community judgments.  
Below, we offer four explanations for why conflict point laws exist. To summarize the 
four explanations: First, legislators are often simply mistaken about what their constituents truly 
believe. It is common for conflict point laws to be justified on the basis of public support that, on 
closer inspection, is a mirage. Politicians are not wholly to blame for these mistakes, as their 
perception of public feeling is subject to various media and polling distortion effects through 
which that feeling is filtered and manipulated.93  
 Second, legislators are often responding to pressure from special interest groups. These 
groups–ranging from agribusiness to recording companies–successfully lobby for conflict point 
laws that benefit their constituencies, often at the expense of doing justice as the broader 
community perceives it. The clearest examples include direct industry protections, such as laws 
attaching unique criminal penalties to theft of milk crates.94  
 Third, legislatures often prioritize coercive crime-control, typically general deterrence or 
incapacitation of the dangerous, at the expense of doing justice. Individual legislators may not be 
conscious of this prioritization; that is, they likely do not contemplate the tensions of trading 
justice against crime control as an academic might. But regardless of what is in the minds of the 
actors, legislation is often grounded in coercive crime-control rationales that generate results in 
conflict with the public’s normative judgments.95  
 Fourth, legislatures often adopt overbroad criminal law rules that, in practice, delegate 
criminalization decisions to judges and prosecutors. The result is rules of sufficient breadth that 
they may not directly command injustice, but they sanction enough discretion for other actors 
that doing injustice can easily result. Laws that lump conduct of radically different seriousness 
within the same offense grade,96 for example, leave it to judges to make ad hoc calls on a 
defendant’s deserved punishment. And, inevitably, different judges will make different 
judgments on similar cases, thereby introducing not only arbitrariness and unjustified disparity, 
but also dispositions that will conflict with community views.97 
 A few caveats are in order before we dive into these conflict-point explanations. To begin 
with, conflict-point laws, like any other piece of legislation, usually have multiple forces that 
drive their passage, with no single casual analysis producing a complete picture.98 For the laws 
examined below, we do not claim to provide the final and complete accounting of the legislative 
motivations at work—this is not a work of legal history. Rather, we seek to identify what are, at 
least, important reasons why legislatures choose to pass laws in tension with community views. 
 
92 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What Happened to Tocqueville's America? 74 SOC. RES. 251 (2007) 
93 This point can be connected to larger critiques about the reliability of polling as a means of divining public 
opinion. See, e.g., https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-polls-are-dead-long-live-politics-11605809242?page=1; 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/25/which-2020-election-polls-were-most-least-accurate/ 
(discussing recent failures of the polls to predict the behavior of the American electorate and potential explanations). 
94 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-102.2 (West 1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-72.4 (West 1994). 
95 See supra n. 15. 
96 See, e.g., 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. § 2903(b) (West) (false imprisonment of a minor).  
97 Although judges are themselves members of the community (as are legislators), their professional training and 
experience may distort their ability to access the intuitive judgments most of the population automatically generate.  
See Joshua Bowers and Paul H Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional 
Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 596. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/596. 
98 Indeed, many of the laws we examine below, such as extreme penalties for drug offenses, could easily recur between 
different explanation sections, highlighting different angles of their history and rationale. Partly for presentation 
reasons, we seek to have a limited range of unique, illustrative examples under each explanation heading, with a law’s 
placement determined by which factor seemed most predominant or clear from its history or objective purpose 
(excepting Three Strikes). Again, we do not claim to provide the final or definitive analysis of any specific criminal 
law and this is not an article on legal history. 
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There are clearly many reasons why the California legislature passed a Three Strikes law in 
1994, including unique party and electoral dynamics active at the time;99 but there is sufficient 
evidence of legislative mistake about the public’s judgment that this error can at least be called a 
substantial factor explaining why the law got through.100  
 Further, we do not claim that the explanations offered below are exhaustive. This essay is 
not meant as a complete taxonomy of criminal law-making behavior. Rather, our explanations 
represent an initial attempt to delineate the most significant causes of legislative misfire. We 
maintain that the identification of causes offered here is sufficiently complete that helpful 
proposals for reform based on them can be suggested in Part V. In the future, the identification of 
more detailed causal stories can form the basis for further reform proposals. 
 
A. Legislative Mistake 
 
 Here, we consider several prominent examples of legislative mistake: modern criminal 
law enactments that were explicitly justified by proponents on the ground of popular support, but 
that are in tension with popular intuitions of justice: insanity defense abolition, three strikes, and 
trying juveniles as adults.101 We then consider some of the potential structural reasons why 
legislators consistently make such errors. 
 Insanity Defense Narrowing or Abolition. The driving force behind Kansas’s abolition of 
the insanity defense was the legislature’s perception that the public demanded it. The Petitioner’s 
Brief in the Kahler case made exactly this point in detailing the legislative history, stating that 
“public fear and frustration about crime” prompted legislators to narrow the insanity defense.102 
The apparent public enmity for the defense at the time was focused on two contemporaneous 
Kansas cases in which the defendants had committed deadly shootings and then been quickly 
acquitted on the basis of insanity.103 Indeed, the legislature heard powerful testimony from the 
mother of one of the victims, who attacked the state’s then-existing insanity regime.104 These 
trials were local instantiations of a broader public “outcry” initially prompted by the acquittal of 
John Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President Reagan,105 with Kansas’s 
legislature choosing to go further along the abolitionist path than the U.S. Congress would 
ultimately proceed.106  
 
99 See generally ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY.  
100 Likewise there is evidence that the Kansas legislature chose to abolish the insanity defense on the ground that doing 
so would prioritize crime control (see Kahler v. Kansas J.A. at 294), but this explanation seems to the authors 
subsidiary to the role played by the legislative mistake about public views on the defense.  
101 We are willing to assume a certain amount of legislative sincerity in their appeals to popular support. While it is 
conceivable that many legislators use these appeals automatically, as mere rhetorical moves, it is also the case that 
self-interested legislators need to care at least to some degree about what their constituents believe and support.  
102 See Kahler v. Kansas Petitioner’s Brief at 2-3. (citing contemporary newspaper articles, including one with the 
memorable title of “Getting tough on the mentally ill”). 
103 See id. Both men were immediately committed after their acquittals. Montana is an interesting contrast.Abolition 
of the defense occurred there in 1979, before Hinckley or the national ‘movement’ against the defense. There were no 
other comparable local and sensational cases to focus the legislature’s attention. See King-Ries, Arbitrary and God-
like, and Insanity Defense and its Alternatives at 12; Rita Buitendorp, A Statutory Lesson from "Big Sky Country” on 
Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 30 Valparaiso L. Rev. 965 
(https://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1902&context=vulr). 
104 See Kahler v. Kansas, Brief of Lynn Denton, Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Et. Al.  
105 See Hinkley Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, N.Y. TIMES 
(https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/24/us/hinkley-acquittal-brings-moves-to-change-insanity-defense.html) (phone 
polling at the time showed 74% of respondents felt that justice had not been done in the case). .  
106 See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (modifying federal insanity defense law by, inter alia, placing the 
burden of proof on the defendant). 
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 Raymond Spring, the architect and key proponent of the mens rea approach Kansas 
ultimately adopted,107 has also argued that the legislature was responding to perceived public 
pressure to “reform” the insanity defense. He believes that the Kansas legislature’s repeated 
attempts to narrow the defense made “clear that the Legislature was seeking to be responsive in a 
responsible way to public anxiety,” that the legislators were “[r]esponding to public concerns 
generated by a few highly visible cases” and that ultimate enactment of his proposal ensured that 
“public concerns have been addressed.”108 Other, independent commentators on the law’s 
passage have agreed with Spring’s analysis, with one stating that the Kansas legislature acted “to 
soothe public concerns and gain popularity” and that “[t]he public's negative perception of the 
insanity defense is a major reason why the Kansas Legislature abolished [it].”109 These 
conclusions are borne out by examples from the legislative history, with one proponent of the 
abolition bill (Rep. Elaine Wells) declaring that “the public outcry continues to mount of the 
injustice that occurs whenever another insanity defense is used.”110 
 Congressmen like Rep. Wells certainly had evidence to back up their claims of public 
outcry. In the wake of the Hinckley acquittal, one contemporary phone poll concluded that 74% 
of respondents believed that “justice had not been done” in the case.111 Other polls produced 
similar results.112 As we have discussed, however, there are substantial problems with relying on 
top-line poll results of this sort in gauging the public’s true views about criminal justice issues.113  
 Moreover, it is a mistake to confuse transient public views about a particular insanity plea 
with deeply ingrained community judgments about the blameworthiness of insane offenders 
generally. The public likely just believed (based on very incomplete and distorted information) 
that Hinckley himself did not qualify as blamelessly insane. Yet the United States Congress 
seemed to fall into precisely this trap. Even the drafters of the Insanity Defense Reform Act 
explicitly recognized that much perceived public “disapproval” of the insanity defense only 
existed because people were misled into believing “myths” about the defense (such as its 
frequency of success, the likelihood of effective malingering, etc.).114 According to M.L. Perlin, 
this amounted to a concession that “congress must assuage myths it knows to be false” if those 
myths seem to “undermine public faith in the justice system.”115 To us, this shows the full extent 
to which mistaken perceptions of public disapproval have influenced legislative action in the 
insanity defense context: the U.S. Congress believed so strongly that the then-extant version of 
the federal insanity defense undermined public faith in the justice system, that they were willing 
to act on the basis of known falsehoods. All this to assuage a non-existent popular judgment that 
the insanity defense ought to be narrowed or eliminated. 
 Three Strikes and Other Habitual Offender Statutes. The recent history of American 
habitual offender laws presents a similar story of legislators motivated by mistaken perceptions 
of public views. As we explained in Part III, ordinary people do see repeat offenses as being 
somewhat more blameworthy than comparable first-time offenses.116 However, this 
enhancement effect is negligible when compared to the extreme sentencing differentials doled 
 
107 See Kahler, Brief for Respondent, at 32 (calling Spring “the leading advocate for the mens rea approach in Kansas” 
who “ultimately played a key role in convincing the Kansas Legislature to adopt it.”) 
108 Spring, Farewell to Insanity 44-45. 
109 Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas,  8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 253 (1998-1999). 
110 See Kahler, J.A. at 293. 
111 See supra note 107. 
112  Valerie P. Hans and Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public's Verdict, THE PUBLIC 
OPINION QUARTERLY, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), pp. 202-212.  
113 See infra p. 23 (discussing distortion effects).   
114 Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of them All: A Critical Analysis of the Cosntitutional Implications of Abolishing 
the Insanity Defense 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1509, n. 9 (2002). 
115 Id. . 
116 See supra Pt. III. 
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out under contemporary law.117 Yet, analysis of legislative history and other evidence suggests 
that mistaken perceptions of public support for habitual offender laws has, at least since the 
1990s, played a prominent role in getting such laws passed.  
 Consider the California case, where a variant of Three Strikes was made law in the wake 
of the tragic and highly publicized murders of Polly Klass and Kimber Reynolds—two young 
girls who were each killed by men with extensive criminal histories.118 The new law imposed life 
imprisonment for anyone convicted of three “serious felonies”—a category broad enough to 
include burglary and drug possession—and included a five year sentence enhancement after the 
“second strike”.119 California’s Three Strikes law was far and away the most significant in the 
United States, when judged by the number of defendants who have been sentenced under it.120  
 Contemporary evidence makes clear that perceived public support played an important 
role in the legislature’s (and governor’s) decision to support Three Strikes. Indeed, then-
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown stated that there was so much public pressure in favor of the 
bill that it was being passed without sufficient consideration: “This is a representative body. And 
(legislators) believe they are representing the will of their constituency.”121 Brown stated that he 
himself was unable to catalyze a better dialogue and instead, “got out of the way of this train 
because I am a realist.”122 Legislative sensitivity to perceived voter opinion was heightened at 
the time, as the campaign for three-strikes played out against the backdrop of an election year in 
California.123  
 Willie Brown was not the only California politician to come around to reluctantly 
supporting Three Strikes in spite of personal misgivings. Senator Leroy Green, for example, 
expressed similar sentiments: “I'm going to vote for these turkeys [the five three strikes 
measures] because my constituents want me to.”124 Commentators since have picked up on this 
evidence and consistently concluded that perceived public fervor was critical to the enactment of 
California’s Three Strikes law.125 Some of these same writers make the mistake of concluding 
this perception of public support was accurate—that the people of California (and other states) 
truly had abandoned any commitment to proportionality in sentencing. This conclusion could not 
be more wrong, as demonstrated by the empirical studies revealing that the public does not in 
fact hold the views attributed to them.126   
 Juvenile Offender Laws. In a recent work on juvenile justice, Gideon Yaffe deploys a 
common-sense argument: “Kids who commit crimes are less culpable than adults. Kids who 
commit crimes are deserving of lesser sanctions than adults. And it is because of these facts that 
we are warranted in adopting policies under which kids who commit crimes are treated more 
leniently than adults who commit crimes.”127 As we saw in Part III, this conclusion is in 
harmony with popular judgments of justice as revealed by social scientific research.128 Yet, in 
the contemporary United States, the prosecution of juveniles in adult court–and resultant 
 
117 Id. 
118 See Schultz, No Joy in Mudville, 569-71. see also ROBINSON, CRIMES THAT CHANGED OUR WORLD. 
119 Id. 
120 See generally ZIMRING, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY.  
121 See https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-03-02-mn-28983-story.html.  
122 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationlity, 87 J. Crim. L. & Crimonology 395, n. 113 (1997). 
123 See generally id. 
124 Id. at n. 113.  
125 See Vitiello, Schultz, Zimring.Though note recent changes to the law mitigating some of its harshness. 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/california_begins_to_release_prisoners_after_reforming_its_three-
strikes_la. 
126 See supra Pt. III. 
127 YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY 158.  
128 See supra Pt. III.  
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exposure to adult sentences–is commonplace.129 Every jurisdiction in the country permits 
transfer to adult court under some circumstances, sometimes with no minimum statutory age, in 
two cases with a minimum age of only 10 years; until recently New York state placed certain 
offenders over the age of 15 into adult court by default (a practice that continues in North 
Carolina).130 
 The common law generally treated juvenile offenders similarly to adults, with a special 
set of presumptions operating in felony prosecutions (that one under seven was conclusively 
presumed incapable of committing the crime, that this presumption was rebuttable between the 
ages of seven and fourteen, and that no presumption in favor of the accused would operate over 
fourteen).131 But one should not imagine that harsh transfer laws are a simple holdover from the 
common law era. Rather, the current state of juvenile justice is the result of a long evolution 
away from the common law, which began in the late 19th century, and reached its current form as 
a result of statutory changes of the 1980s and 90s.132 Between 1992 and 1997, for example, laws 
in 45 states were passed making it easier to transfer juveniles into adult court.133 Our position is 
that much of this shift towards harsher treatment of juveniles can be explained by legislative 
error in perceiving popular support for such measures.  
 Consider the case of Pennsylvania’s Act 33, which was made law in March 1996.134 The 
Act made several changes to juvenile justice in Pennsylvania, the flavor of which can be 
gathered from the amendment of the “purpose” clause to include, as goals: to “provide balanced 
attention to the protection of the community [and] the imposition of accountability for offenses 
committed….”135 The new approach emphasizing punishment and crime control included an 
expansion of the statutory exclusion list (those charges that will automatically place a juvenile 
defendant 14 or older in the adult system) and the addition of several new factors to be 
considered by juvenile courts in discretionary waiver proceedings, including “the threat to the 
safety of the public or any individual posed by the juvenile” and “the degree of the juvenile's 
culpability”).136 
 Act 33 reflected poll results indicating mass public support for trying juveniles 14 and 
older accused of violent crimes as adults.137 State politicians who supported Act 33 apparently 
believed such national results accurately reflected the attitude of their own constituents and acted 
accordingly in ensuring the law’s passage. Senator Fisher, for example, one of the co-sponsors 
and principal proponent of the act, stated during legislative deliberations that “when you look at 
the perceptions of the general public across Pennsylvania, people are fed up with violent crime, 
and they are particularly fed up with violent crime that has been committed and continues to be 
 
129 See Robinson, Disutility of Injustice, 1953.  
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committed in this Commonwealth by juveniles.”138 According to Fisher, the Act would be 
responsive to this public attitude: “It is a sensible step that is going to say to the people of 
Pennsylvania who are tired of being held up, who are tired of being robbed by young juveniles 
who are committing crimes and getting off like other juveniles, it is a sensible step that is going 
to say that that is going to end.”139 Fisher described his perception of public demands: “I believe 
that is what the people of Pennsylvania have been telling us … If they are convicted, they are 
going to be sentenced to a long period of time in jail, just as an adult offender would. I believe 
this is an appropriate step. I believe it is a step that the people of Pennsylvania have asked us to 
take, and I urge approval of Senate Bill No. 100 as it is before the Senate today from colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle.”140 
 Juvenile justice is also the backdrop for a new trend in conflict point legislation: crafting 
laws that depart from community views by showing too much leniency to offenders. Most of the 
conflict laws examined in this article buck public judgment in the opposite direction, by 
imposing too much punishment on habitual offenders, or punishing insane persons whom the 
public would hold blameless. However, some new proposals keep conflict alive through 
overcorrection. For example, Vermont legislators in 2016 passed a law allowing offenders up to 
age 20 to be tried in the juvenile system.141 Similar proposals have appeared in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New York, and Illinois, but thus far have had little success.142 New proposals 
continue to appear.143 A more extreme version of this idea has recently been considered in the 
Colorado legislature; the bill there would permit defendants as old as 25 to potentially be placed 
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.144 While Part III laid out in brief that 
community views support leniency for true juvenile offenders (as the public perceives the 
category), the same research reveals that the public does not give comparable culpability 
discounts to a twenty-year old offender as it does to a twelve or fifteen-year-old.145 Scott, et. al.’s 
research reveals that a majority of American adults believe the minimum age for adult criminal 
prosecution generally should be about 16.146 The study results also suggest that public judgment 
does not agree with raise-the-age advocate’s argument that 20-year-olds have comparable 
psychosocial maturity and culpability levels to 15-year-olds.147 
 Distortion Effects. Why is it that legislators make these errors about the content of public 
judgment? Or, put another way: How do we resolve the apparent conflict between the social 
 
138 Pa. Legis. J. June 19, 1995 (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/1995/1/Sj19950619.pdf#page=3). 
139 Id. Also noting the “checks and balances” in the bill that could potentially check transfer to adult court in 
inappropriate cases; so that’s crime-control tradeoff right there; because they must recognize that the law as written is 
going to result in injustices and they want a release valve on it. 
140 Pa. Legis. J. October 25, 1995 (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/1995/1/Sj19951025.pdf#page=2). 
141 Aidan Ryan, Crime bill would redefine juveniles as up to age 21, BOSTON GLOBE (July 9, 2019) 
(https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/09/crime-bill-would-redefine-juveniles-
age/maHshbBT6QaaX9ooVDVidN/story.html).  
142 Id.  
143 See, e.g., SB-889 Juveniles: Juvenile court jurisdiction (2019-2020) 
(https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB889) (CA bill that would raise 
the age of juvenile jurisdiction to 19). 
144 Michael Karlik,  Legislative committee advances criminal justice reform package, COLORADO POLITICS (October 
31, 2019) (https://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/legislative-committee-advances-criminal-justice-reform-
package/article_ad49744a-fb77-11e9-bd07-43c207545f11.html). 
145 Scott, et. al., Public Attitudes About the Culpability and Punishment of Young Offenders,  Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 07-135 
(https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2457&context=faculty_scholarship). 
146 Id. at 16.] 
147 Id. at 34. For the raise-the-age argument see Deborah Becker, Why Vermont Raised Its Juvenile Court Age Above 
18 — And Why Mass. Might, Too, WBUR NEWS (October 3, 2019) (https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/10/03/juvenile-
court-age-vermont-massachusetts) ("For 18 and 19 year olds, they're actually not that different from their 16- and 17-
[year-old] counterparts. We know that, generally, emerging adults grow out of impulsive behavior.")  
23 
 
science and the popular opinion polls? We have seen this disjunction repeatedly, in the context of 
the insanity defense, three strikes laws, etc., that is, of a lenient public as revealed by social 
science, versus a ravenous public revealed by opinion polling and politicians’ rhetoric. While 
this disjunct is not the primary focus of the present article, sufficient groundwork has been laid 
elsewhere that we can sketch out an analysis that will help contextualize our argument.148 
To begin with, most opinion polls are blunt instruments. Politicians who claim public 
backing for harsh measures against criminals are apt to cite the bluntest surveys of all: those that 
ask brief, binary questions, especially about hot policy issues (e.g. ‘Do you support the death 
penalty?’ or ‘Do you support Three Strikes?’).149 By contrast, a social scientific study can 
present subjects with a variety of subtly different scenarios and then prompt the person to grade 
the scenarios by perceived blameworthiness, thus producing much more nuanced results, results 
that reveal a more lenient public than is often assumed.150 The more punitive results of the 
simpler surveys can be explained by considering how lay people answer general questions about 
crime: by reference to paradigm cases. When a citizen thinks about the appropriate sentence for a 
crime, she calls to mind a prototype or exemplar of the crime, which causes a systematic 
distortion, because the prototype is usually the most clear, unqualified case. For example, when 
asked about capital punishment, most citizens would think about deliberate murder, and not the 
cases that would require qualifying descriptions. In other words, when thinking of murder cases, 
the citizen does not automatically consider mercy killings or killings done under provocation. 
Such distortions of the content of specific offenses occur for other crimes besides murder as well. 
The dynamic is exacerbated by the fact that news coverage presents a misleading perspective of 
the frequency with which such dramatic crimes occur. In one analysis, 25% of media crime 
stories were about murder, yet murder is involved in a fraction of 1% of crimes.151  
Further, when the media reports on particular crimes, they are apt to present an 
incomplete--and thus misleading portrait--of the events examined. This distortion may lead 
citizens to conclude that a criminal has been sentenced too leniently, because the media simply 
did not report on the facts that were considered in mitigation. At least one study supports this 
hypothesis. Julian V. Roberts and Anthony N. Doob examined how the public would perceive 
sentences if they had a different source of case accounts.152 These researchers derived their own 
‘court records’ account of a reported ‘newspaper’ case from the official courtroom records, 
creating a summary from actual quotes from the proceedings (or by paraphrasing actual 
documents). Importantly, the summary included much information that is generally not found in 
news reports—including the offender’s previous convictions, a brief description of the offense, 
the defense’s and prosecution’s arguments regarding sentencing for the offender, a summary of 
the presentence reports, and the final comments offered by the judge. Presenting two subject 
groups with either the ‘court documents’ account, or the ‘newspaper’ account created a clear 
disjunction: the former group were much more likely to conclude that the appropriate sentence 
had been imposed, whereas the latter group substantially more often thought it too lenient.153  
Moreover, the media’s presentation of general crime issues is colored by the fact that the 
government is commonly the source for the information reported.154 [Beckett has connected this 
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fact to the possibility that the public does not cause politicians to focus on harshening criminal 
punishment, but the reverse: that politicians gin up public concern about crime as an electoral 
strategy.155 This hypothesis receives support from the lack of clear relationship between the 
crime rate and expressed public concern about crime.156  Consider that in June 1993, only 7% of 
respondents in a national poll identified crime as the nation’s most important problem; by August 
1994, this percentage had increased to 52%.157 Amazingly, this increase contradicted the crime 
trends at the time, which showed a decreased over that period.158 However, then President 
Clinton’s January 1994 State of the Union address spent significant time addressing the ‘crime 
problem’ in the country,159 and— most importantly—one of the country’s most significant 
crime-control bills, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, was debated 
in Congress and passed that year. There is no doubt that these political events contributed 
significantly to the rise in public concern over crime policy that occurred between 1993 and 
1994. 
None of these factors is definitive and this short exegesis is far from exhaustive. But we 
have endeavored to give the reader at least a hint of why we are so confident in the social science 
results, despite their tension with conventional wisdom and the results of many opinion surveys. 
 Fostering Ignorance. In the next section, we will consider the role that special interest 
group pressure plays in creating laws that conflict with community views. By way of transition, 
we note that interest group lobbying intersects with legislative mistake; that is, interest groups 
may actively promote the legislators’ ignorance about true public judgment.  
 First, notice who is actually represented at congressional hearings on criminal justice 
topics. Lisa Miller conducted research on witnesses at Congressional hearings on crime for the 
period between 1947-1998.160 She concluded, on the basis of outsized representation, that 
“federal, state, and local criminal justice bureaucrats have come to occupy a central role in the 
process of defining policy alternatives.”161 Significantly, this dominance comes at the expense of 
community and victim groups, as well as average citizens: “a mobilization of citizen/community 
groups [as a lobbying force] seems never to have materialized. The virtual absence of 
community groups is striking, particularly as national legislators refer to public support for 
punishment to justify lengthy sentences and increased spending on the criminal justice 
system.”162 (Social science researchers on community justice judgments are never called as 
witnesses at legislative hearings, as far as we know.) This practice limits the range of viewpoints 
to which legislators are exposed. 
 Second, consider the ability of criminal justice bureaucrats to represent the views of the 
public. It is likely drowned out by their incentive to pursue the parochial interests of their 
respective institutions and by their unique professional experiences. One of us has argued that 
“the viewpoints of police, prosecutors, and judges are shaded and shaped by their professional 
training and experience. Put differently, what technocrats perceive to be fair and just is not 
necessarily what laypersons perceive to be fair and just. Criminal-justice functionaries may 
simply be too institutionalized to tap and assess their own intuitions as means to effectively 
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157 Id. at 25. 
158 Id. 
159 President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union 126, 127, 
133-35 (Jan. 25, 1994), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. gov/cgi-
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160 See Miller, Re-Thinking Bureaucrats in the National Policy Process (2004). 
161 Id. at 1.  
162 Id. at 582 (citing Beckett).  
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decipher prevailing lay beliefs.”163 The upshot is that legislators are, again, less likely to be 
exposed to lay intuitions of justice, at least in the context of congressional hearings.164  
 This situation is especially precarious from an empirical desert standpoint because the 
legislature may be misled into thinking the bureaucrat’s judgment can be treated as a proxy for 
the lay one. Stuntz has argued that Congress assumes a demand by federal prosecutors will have 
“immediate credibility with the public–more credibility than it deserves” because of mistaken 
beliefs about the relation between state and federal prosecution.165 As a result, Congress acts like 
it will be seen publicly as soft-on-crime if it spurns federal prosecutors’ demands, even when 
those demands are out-of-step with actual public priorities and views.166 Effectively, the 
prosecutor’s judgment may come to be seen by the legislator as an expression of the community 
judgment, when in reality it often is not. 
 
B. Interest Group Pressure 
 
 It has long been taken as given that interest group dynamics explain much legislative 
behavior. Since the 1970s, public choice theory has provided a powerful and influential analysis 
of politicians as self-interested actors who generally seek to maximize their chances of re-
election.167 In other words, when we elect a legislator, we have not created a saint who will 
consistently work for the public good; we have instead positioned a personally ambitious person 
into a seat in the legislature from which he will keep a keen eye on his own personal interests.168 
 The legislator faces the need to raise money for increasingly expensive re-election 
campaigns and to take legislative stands that will attract voter support in later elections. 
Therefore, one priority of the incumbent is to cast votes that do the bidding of various interest 
groups. The interest groups’ response is to “pay off” the legislator for a favorable vote. The 
payoffs can be campaign contributions, votes that the interest group can mobilize for the 
candidate, or implicit promises of future campaign contributions (and sometimes—a current 
favorite—a promise of a lobbying position in the interest group organization or in lobbying firms 
the interest group controls after the politician leaves office).169  
 In the context of criminal law, this legislative incentive structure has given rise to a 
panoply of criminal code provisions that sacrifice doing justice in the service of a particular 
interest group’s lobbying demands. We discuss a number of examples below. In some cases, we 
present specific evidence of the lobbying group’s efforts to create the law in question, but in 
others the linkage is frankly self-evident.  
 Industry Protections. This may well be the single most voluminous category of conflict 
laws, that is, those which enhance or create criminal sanctions in order to protect an industry 
group’s economic interests. These laws can conflict with community judgments in two ways: 
first, by criminalizing conduct that the public views as basically non-criminal; second, by 
singling out behavior that is already criminalized for sentencing enhancement, solely on the 
ground that it harms a particular industry. The latter treatment is usually achieved by creating a 
 
163 Joshua Bowers and Paul H Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice, 263.  
164 If bureaucrats have become too institutionalized to tap common intuitive judgment, than a similar effect may well 
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redundant offense provision, which can then be charge-stacked with the more generic offense 
(e.g. criminal mischief and agricultural vandalism in Pennsylvania170).  
 Start with an example drawn from the first category: illegal music copying/sharing, i.e. 
piracy. This conduct is treated as a felony at the federal level171 and many states have 
comparable classifications.172 But it seems unlikely that these criminal provisions are a reflection 
of democratic will, given that “46% of all Americans and 70% of Americans aged 18-29 have 
illegally copied or downloaded videos or music; only 52% of all Americans and 37% of 
Americans aged 18-29 support criminal penalties for such copying or downloading; and only 
12% of all Americans think such copying or downloading should be punishable with 
imprisonment.”173 At a minimum then, we can say there is a strong consensus that the copyright 
laws are unduly harsh by the lights of the American public. This fact can be demonstrated by 
taking a particular state as a case study. In Pennsylvania, the offense of CD duplication is graded 
as a first-degree misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum sentence of five years 
imprisonment.174 But according to a study of Pennsylvania residents, the people of the 
Commonwealth view CD duplication as equivalent to a mere summary offense.175 The obvious 
reason then for the draconian offense grading here is legislative “susceptibility to the influence of 
moneyed lobbyists.”176 The recording (and film and software) industries see piracy as a threat to 
their bottom-line, so they exert their influence to get criminal measures passed to deter the 
behavior. Legislators comply despite the conflict with community views, deferring instead to the 
interest group’s power. Legislators may also count on prosecutorial discretion to ensure that only 
the most serious copyright law violators are actually criminally sanctioned.177   
 Or take an example from our second category: the unauthorized use of milk crates.178 In 
North Carolina, for example, anyone who “[t]akes, buys, sells or disposes of any dairy milk case 
or milk crate, bearing the name or label of the owner, without the express or implied consent of 
the owner or his designated agent” has committed a Class 2 misdemeanor, punishable by up to 
30 days imprisonment for a first offense.179 This law is redundant, as larceny and possessing and 
receiving stolen goods are already codified offenses in North Carolina.180 The situation in 
Pennsylvania is similar, but the law sweeps more broadly and punishes more harshly, doling out 
as much as 90 days imprisonment to the criminal milk-crate-user.181 We assume that community 
judgment would not divine a morally-salient difference in offender blameworthiness between a 
milk-crate thief (or mere unlawful user) and one who steals or misappropriates any generic 
movable property of comparable value.182 And yet the state codes consistently single out milk 
crates for special punishment. The reason for this conflict is industry lobbying; the dairy industry 
 
170 18 PA 3304; 18 PA 3309.  
171 See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012) (penalties as harsh as 10 years for a repeat offender). 
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ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIV., COPY CULTURE IN THE US & GERMANY 30-31, 40-41 (2013)) 
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apparently takes milk crate theft very seriously and expends substantial capital to ensure such 
laws are passed to protect its interests.183  
 Examples like the above could spill on for pages. Legislatures are clearly open to 
attempts by particular industries to use criminal code drafting to obtain unique protections for 
their parochial interests.  
 
C. Prioritizing Coercive Crime Control 
 
 Much modern criminal law represents an explicit legislative decision to prioritize crime 
control over doing justice. The main crime control philosophies that became dominant over 
legislative thinking in the late twentieth century are general deterrence and incapacitation of the 
dangerous.184 Three Strikes, harsh drug offenses, adherence to the traditional felony-murder 
doctrine and other strict liability offenses all represent victories for these consequentialist goals. 
Such victories come at the expense of justice as conceived by the public, a result that has not 
only deontological costs, but also the consequentialist crime control cost of undermining the 
law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby its crime-control effectiveness, as 
discussed in section II.B.2. (That is, these popular crime-control doctrines meant to maximize 
deterrence and incapacitation–“coercive crime control"–seriously undermine the “normative 
crime control” that comes with maximizing the criminal law’s moral credibility.) 
 In Part III, we demonstrated that each of these coercive of crime-control doctrines is in 
tension with public normative judgment as revealed by social science. Now, our objective will be 
to show that the legislative motivation in the enactment of such conflict doctrines was largely 
grounded in coercive crime-control rationales.  
 Thus far, we have assumed some legislative good faith; that when a legislator declared 
her constituents supported a bill, that she really (though mistakenly) believed that assertion. 
Here, we will remain agnostic as to whether legislators passing coercive crime-control laws 
understood they were spitting on the blameworthiness-proportionality thinking so dear to the 
public. We do not know whether individual legislators consciously made a self-serving judgment 
that the political fallout from rising crime rates was more dangerous to their electoral future than 
subjecting citizens to unjust criminal punishments. It is possible that few thought about their 
actions in terms of an explicit “trade-off,” despite how clear the academic origins of their 
arguments are on this point. A student of the philosophy of punishment will quickly find herself 
frustrated by how rudimentary most political analysis of punishment problems is (despite how 
many legislators are lawyers).185 In any case, the upshot for our present analysis is that their 
subjective beliefs are irrelevant; what matters is that, objectively speaking, they have chosen to 
pass many laws that prioritize coercive crime control to the detriment of justice.  
 Three Strikes. In the late twentieth century, a belief took hold in legal academic and 
political circles that incapacitating a relatively small number of offenders could produce large 
crime control gains.186 Some estimated that “as few as 5 percent of all offenders may account for 
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over half of all robberies and other violent crimes for gain. This research suggested that in many 
cases simple incarceration for a longer period of time of some habitual criminals would reduce 
the number of crimes.”187 Powerful evidence for this position seemed to come from the famed 
Philadelphia birth cohort study, analyses of which held out the possibility of decreasing serious 
crimes by as much as 35% via incapacitation of select, repeat offenders.188 In the early 1990s, 
this approach was highlighted by the perception of rising crime rates and general belief that 
rehabilitation had failed as a penal philosophy.189 The stage was set for a new generation of 
harsh habitual offender laws, most notably three strikes and its variants.  
 Neither the consequentialist justifications for three strikes nor its frequent conflict with 
community views of blameworthiness proportionality are difficult to demonstrate. As for the 
conflict, we laid the evidence out in Part III, showing that ordinary people do not support such 
dramatic enhancement of criminal punishment on the basis of prior offense history. The public 
still believes in blameworthiness proportionality, despite the long-standing academic critiques of 
the concept.190 This faith leads them to gasp at the notion of giving a man like Rummel life in 
prison for his minor air conditioner fraud and undermines the explanatory power of polling 
results showing public support for three strikes laws.  
 Further, the evidence shows that coercive crime control reasoning was an important 
factor in legislative decisions to enact such laws. As early as 1975, the logic of incapacitation 
was sounded from the highest levels of government, with President Gerald Ford declaring that 
“[t]he crime rate will go down if persons who habitually commit most of the predatory crimes 
are kept in prison for a reasonable period . . . because they will not then be free to commit more 
crimes.”191 In California, the legislature had apparently come to similar conclusions years before 
three strikes even became law. Frank Zimring has detailed how the state created a Blue Ribbon 
Commission to study the problem of prison overcrowding, declaring in the authorizing statute 
that: “It is the intent of the Legislature that public safety shall be the overriding concern in 
examining methods of ... heading off runaway inmate population levels," and "Public safety shall 
be the primary consideration on all conclusions and recommendations.”192 The meaning of 
“public safety” in this context turns out to be coercive crime-control.  
 The dominance of this logic in California would continue into the three strikes era. When 
he signed three strikes into law, then-Governor Wilson argued that “I’m convinced that if we are 
sending clear messages to career criminals, we will begin to see them reform their conduct” and 
that keeping prisoners behind bars would prevent them from committing crimes.193 Other 
California lawmakers echoed a cold, coercive crime-control logic. Assemblyman Curt Pringle, 
for example, stated “It’s proven that repeat offenders cost society much more than it costs to 
incarcerate them. We will not have repeat trials; we will not have to re-convict people who will 
be in prison all the longer.”194 Key proponent Assemblyman Richard K. Rainey also made clear 
that the sole purpose of three strikes was future crime control: “We are only talking about the 
most violent people in society [to be placed within the law’s ambit]--the people we have not been 
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able to turn around and who have proven they are going to continue to commit violent 
crimes.”195 Even years after the passage of three strikes, the justifications emanating from the 
state government would remain strictly consequentialist.196  
 Missing from all these justifications is any recognition of the tension between such 
extreme coercive crime control measures and basic principles of blameworthiness 
proportionality—principles we can be certain from the empirical research are held dear by the 
community.197  
 Felony Murder/Strict Liability. The Model Penal Code effectively did away with the 
traditional felony murder doctrine.198 Its proposal has proven one of the less successful of the 
MPC’s reforms, with most states continuing to codify (in various versions) something closer to 
traditional felony murder.199 This situation continues despite the conflict between these criminal 
provisions and public judgment.200 Evidence from legislative history suggests that here too, 
legislatures maintain traditional felony murder doctrines on strictly consequentialist rationales. 
Whereas three strikes justification center on incapacitation, here general deterrence is primary. 
 For example, consider the New Jersey code, which contains a very broad felony murder 
provision.201 It treats felony murder as a strict liability offense and extends liability to deaths 
caused by non-participants in the underlying crime. It then provides a fairly narrow affirmative 
defense.202  
 
195 Dan Morain, Lawmakers Jump On ‘3 Strikes’ Bandwagon : Crime: Several bills that would put habitual criminals 
in prison for good gain support in the Legislature. Also, an initiative drive is winning signatures. But some district 
attorneys are skeptical of its impact, L.A. TIMES (January 31, 1994) (https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-
01-31-mn-17349-story.html). 
196 See 1995 Report of the CA Legislative Analyst’s Office (https://lao.ca.gov/analysis_1995/3strikes.html); CA AG 
Report from 1997 on law’s impact on the crime rate (“‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’—Its Impact on the California 
Criminal Justice System After Four Years.”). 
197 See supra. 
198 It defines murder as follows:  
Section 210.2.  Murder.    
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 Murder. 
 a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when: […] 
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 New Jersey undertook to recodify its criminal law in the 1970s, and based its new code 
primarily on the MPC’s reforms. In the initial draft of the new code, the drafters resolved to 
adopt the MPC’s approach to felony murder and “[b]eyond this, we submit that the felony-
murder doctrine, as a basis for establishing the criminality of homicide, should be abandoned.”203 
The draft floated, as an alternative, the New York approach: retaining felony murder, but a 
limited affirmative defense.204 Ultimately, it was this latter proposal that was adopted, with the 
commission declaring explicitly in their official commentary that felony murder was being 
retained on general deterrence grounds: “The rationale is that if potential felons realize that they 
will be culpable as murderers for a death that occurs during the commission of a felony, they will 
be less likely to commit the felony. From this perspective, the imposition of strict liability 
without regard to the intent to kill serves to deter the commission of serious crimes.”205  
 As we pointed out above, the New Jersey provision is cribbed from New York’s felony 
murder law, and several other states (Connecticut, Maine, Washington) have comparable 
provisions.206 The defense shows the legislature (in picking up the Commission’s proposal and 
reasoning) engaged in a conscious trade-off between general deterrence and doing justice.207 
 The affirmative defense only exists because of recognition that a traditional felony 
murder rule is likely to sweep too broadly. It is an ex-post attempt to reduce the number of unjust 
felony murder convictions, while maintaining the full deterrent force of the doctrine. In New 
Jersey, this point is especially poignant, in that the arguments for the injustice of felony murder 
were explicitly made and initially adopted by the code reform commission. 
 Other serious criminal code provisions resemble this felony murder variant in operating 
as strict liability offenses.208 They are similarly justified on general deterrence grounds, in an 
obvious tradeoff with doing justice. For example, New Jersey carries its own felony murder 
rationale over into a closely related doctrine: strict liability for drug induced deaths.209 In the 
Drug Reform Act of 1987, the state legislature declared “that any person who manufactures, 
 
…except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant 
in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant: 
 (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or 
aid the commission thereof; and 
 (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of 
causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding 
persons; and 
 (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, 
instrument, article or substance; and 
 (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct 
likely to result in death or serious physical injury. 
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distributes, or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance “is strictly liable for a death which 
results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance….”210  
 Thus, despite some recognition by legislatures of the tension between felony murder (and 
other strict liability offenses) and blameworthiness proportionality, they have consistently failed 
to grasp the full extent of the conflict between the laws they endorse and the views of the public 
as revealed by the empirics. 
 Drug Offense Penalties. America’s modern federal sentencing regime for drug offenses 
came into being in the 1980s and early 1990s, in an atmosphere of “frenzied” paranoia about the 
threat that drugs and drug-dealing posed to the country.211 In the lead-up to the passage of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—which instituted new mandatory minimum punishments for 
certain drug crimes—Senator Hawkins exemplified the hysterical tone of the times: “Drugs pose 
a clear and present danger to America's national security.”212 Other legislators echoed this 
militarist and alarmist theme. Sen. Chiles, for example, characterized drugs as "insidious 
invaders" and a "form of terrorism," and described drug dealers as "people, who, while they may 
claim American citizenship, are nothing more than mercenaries without either country or 
conscience.”213 Representative Wright stated that “It is time to declare an all-out war, to mobilize 
our forces . . . in a total coordinated assault upon this menace.”214 Given this framing of the drug 
problem in terms of ‘menace and ‘danger,’ it should be unsurprising that here too legislative 
justifications for harsh laws prioritized coercive crime control over doing justice.  
 Examples of this justification can be found in the history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act—
which famously instituted a 100:1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder-form 
cocaine.215  Senator Leahy, who served on the task force that drafted the Act, announced that: “A 
major part of this bill involves deterrence. . . . These [new] penalties are appropriately aimed at 
the drug kingpins. They will deter any would-be trafficker who is capable of being deterred. . . . 
This will be a very strong deterrent to the next generation of dangerous drugs in their tracks.”216 
The DOJ’s published handbook on the Act described its purposes as follows: “This Act was 
designed to provide a means by which serious, repeat offenders could be effectively deterred 
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from committing further crimes . . . .”217 Likewise, the follow-up Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
contained a variety of provisions that were explicitly justified by a deterrence rationale.  Perhaps 
its most notorious element—the reinstituting of the federal death penalty for so-called “drug 
kingpins”—drew strong support from legislative deterrence-thinking. Senator Dole called it an 
“essential deterrent to crime. For drug kingpins who are indiscriminately spreading death and 
violence, let them know the ultimate sanction will be used against them.”218 Representative 
Conyers opposed the provision, but recognized that its proponents “argue that it will have a 
deterrence effect on those who kill, as well as provide proper punishment to those who have.”219 
Further, the 1988 Act’s provisions for fining drug users were similarly intended to act as “a 
deterrent for [drug] users.”220  
Comparable evidence of deterrence-thinking’s influence on drug policy can be found at 
the state level. Although we are long-past the hey-day of maximalist drug war legislation, the 
ongoing opioid crisis has revived legislative interest in one type of anti-drug law: drug-induced 
homicide legislation.221 A review of such legislation by the Drug Policy Alliance found that 
legislators are again deploying the language of deterrence, just as they had in the 80s and 90s.222 
For example, “In support of Senate Bill 639 in Illinois (which expands the state’s current offense 
of drug-induced homicide), State Senator Bill Haine stated: ‘This measure is about deterrence 
and making it clear we will not stand for illicit drug dealers providing lethal narcotics in our 
state.’ Referring to H.B. 5367 in Connecticut, Representative Kurt Vail said, ‘I want to deter 
people from selling … and taking advantage … Because [dealers are] the ones bringing it into 
the streets. And then maybe when we get one dealer, we can get someone above them.’”223 It is 
striking that, even as many legislatures have softened some of the harshest drug offense penalties 
from earlier decades, they remain wedded to the logic of deterrence in dealing with drug 
offenses.   
 
D. Legislative Preference for Criminal Law Delegation 
 
 Our final conflict explanation is, in a sense, the most speculative. Unsurprisingly, 
legislators are not likely to brag about abdicating their criminalization duties to other government 
actors, at least not in the way they like to brag about protecting public safety by deterring or 
incapacitating offenders. Nevertheless, there is a rich scholarly literature examining this 
phenomenon224 and clear illustrative examples can be exhibited.  
 The core problem is that American legislatures, especially the United States Congress, 
routinely pass criminal laws that are of absurd scope—they theoretically criminalize an 
incredible variety of behavior.225 The legislature does not expect, however, that such laws will be 
enforced to their full extent; indeed, they are counting on judges and prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion, narrowing the scope of what is in practice criminalized. This dynamic is problematic 
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for ensuring criminal law’s consistency with popular judgment. The law may in part punish 
behavior that the public regards as blameworthy, but by casting such a wide net and then 
counting on enforcement discretion there is real risk of punishing individuals whom the public 
would not consider blameworthy or of over-punishing the subtly blameworthy.  
 Consider a recent example of this problem from Yates v. United States. In the wake of the 
Enron scandal (and other conspicuous examples of corporate wrongdoing), Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was designed to combat white collar wrongdoing.226 One 
provision—Section 1519—cured a strange omission in earlier law, by making it a criminal 
offense to: 
 
knowingly alter[], destroy[], mutilate[], conceal[], cover[] up, falsif[y], or make[] a false 
entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction 
of any department or agency of the United States . . . .227 
 
Section 1519 creates a felony, punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment.228  
 Commercial fisherman John Yates was unaware of this provision when, on August 23rd, 
2007, he chose to fling three undersized red grouper into the sea, rather than hand them over to 
federal authorities.229 Yates was indicted and convicted for violating Section 1519, on the logic 
that the groupers were “tangible objects” within the law’s definition.230 He was sentenced to 30 
days imprisonment and three years of supervised release.231 After an affirmance by the 11th 
Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the meaning of “tangible objects” should be 
read more narrowly than “any and every physical object,” in light of the statutory context and, in 
the alternative, that the rule of lenity required such narrowing.232 Four Justices would have 
upheld the conviction. 
 While no study has been conducted based on the Yates case, we submit that popular 
intuitions of justice would not consider tossing back groupers to be as criminally blameworthy 
as, say, distributing child pornography,233 or arson234—and yet Yates was exposed to a 
comparable sentence length of twenty years. This conflict only became possible because 
Congress had swept so widely in Sarbanes-Oxley that the government’s expansive reading of the 
statute appeared reasonable to four Justices of the Supreme Court and to the 11th Circuit. 
Congress had empowered prosecutors (and courts) to make a discretionary judgment about what 
sorts of evidence tampering really ought to warrant the stiff new penalty. From the standpoint of 
empirical desert, federal prosecutors in Yates’s case got the decision terribly wrong.  
 Further examples of this delegation problem can be found at the state level too. One of us 
has undertaken extensive studies of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey criminal codes. These 
studies reveal a consistent issue: the legislature’s failure to distinguish offense seriousness within 
a single offense grade. When the criminal code classes behavior of greatly diverging 
blameworthiness within one offense grade (together with indeterminate sentencing or a wide 
guidelines range calculation), then the code has effectively left decisions about offense 
seriousness to the discretion of individual sentencing judges. These judges may be unelected, or 
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elected within structures that do not respond to popular moral judgment.235 Conformity with lay 
intuition remains possible, but the legislature takes a gamble by abdicating its duty to ensure it. 
 For example, in Pennsylvania, the offense of false imprisonment of a minor is defined so 
broadly as to include both chaining a fourteen-year-old to a wall for a month and illegally 
locking a seventeen-year-old in her room for a half an hour.236 Under current law, both courses 
of conduct are graded as a second degree felony, carrying a maximum sentence of ten years, but 
the Pennsylvania survey participants graded the first as a first degree felony, carrying a 
maximum sentence of twenty years,237 and the second as a third degree misdemeanor, carrying a 
maximum of one year.238 Notice that the ten-year maximum sentence provided by statute is 
higher than is appropriate for the latter conduct but not high enough, in the residents' view, for 
the former. 
 In New Jersey, a waiter who does not declare $500 in cash tips on his tax returns is 
punished under the same offense as an executive who sets up an off-shore account in which he 
hides $100,000 to avoid paying taxes.239 Under current law, both courses of conduct are graded 
as 3rd degree crimes, with a maximum sentence of 5 years,240 but New Jersey residents graded 
the first scenario as a disorderly persons offense, with a maximum sentence of 6 months,241 and 
the second scenario as a 3rd degree crime, with a maximum sentence of 5 years.242 
 Multiplying such examples by looking through state criminal codes would, unfortunately, 
be a time-consuming exercise. But the true challenge lies in discovering why legislatures are so 
keen to delegate their authority over the substantive criminal law. After all, one might expect 
legislatures to try to increase their own authority, reducing the independence of judges and 
prosecutors whose decisions may undermine legislative priorities. Legislators engage in lots of 
criminal law-making—the Illinois legislator, for example, added “hundreds of new offenses” to 
their state code between 1961 and 2003243—so it is not as though legislators are uninterested in 
the subject. What can explain this delegation phenomenon then?  
 The answer is debated, and a complete engagement would take us far beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, several proffered explanations warrant mention, as they are relevant to our 
corrective project. First, legislatures may see a legitimate policy virtue in expansive offense 
definition, as a means to head off new and creative forms of criminal conduct.244 On this logic, 
the legislator is giving the prosecutor tools that will be ready-to-hand in a new situation when the 
need arises, but before a new offense provision can be legislated, lest a novel criminal scheme 
escape punishment. Second, expansive laws may allow legislators to reap the political rewards of 
symbolic criminal legislation, whilst being insulated from any potential blow-back.245 The 
rewards lie in dynamics we have already discussed, such as the desire to appear “tough-on-
crime” by never opposing new criminal enactments, no matter how badly written; while the 
insulation comes from the tradition of prosecutorial discretion: “because prosecutors will rarely 
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charge sympathetic defendants, when they do, and when the case becomes known to the public, 
the public is likely to blame not the overbroad statute but the overaggressive prosecutor.”246 
Third, Congress may use non-textual methods to claw back some of its authority. Richman has 
argued that Congress ultimately does have tools at its disposal to control the enforcement of the 
federal criminal law, tools that transcend the code’s text, such as budgetary control of 
enforcement agencies.247 
 In sum, the phenomenon of legislative delegation in criminal lawmaking is far from well-
understood, but it is sufficiently influential problem that any writer interested in the substantive 
criminal law today cannot afford to ignore it. This Article certainly cannot, given the serious and 
abiding risk it represents for ensuring conformity between the law and popular moral judgment.  
 
V. Proposed Reforms 
 
 The obvious way to fix these problems is for the legislature to have criminal law rules 
track closer to community views so as to build the criminal law’s moral credibility with the 
community. But how is this to be done? Certainly, making legislators more aware of the costs of 
conflict with community justice judgments is an obvious starting point. But, again, as a practical 
matter how is this to be done? Here are three proposals for how things can realistically be moved 
in the right direction. 
 First, shouldn’t the legislature at least know what community justice judgments are on an 
issue before they enact a criminal law rule? That is, shouldn’t they at least know whether the 
proposed rule conflicts with community views? It would seem hard to argue against having such 
knowledge, for the many reasons discussed in Part II: to promote democratic values, to more 
effectively reduce crime by building the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community, 
and to better approximate true transcendent justice. Imposing such a requirement–that the 
legislature find out whether the proposed rule conflicts or not – would be analogous to providing 
an environmental impact or fiscal impact statement for a proposed bill. It would simply assure 
that the legislature had given sufficient serious consideration to the issue and was acting with 
knowledge of the relevant facts. 
 Part of the challenge here will be to educate legislators about how unreliable polls and 
surveys are in determining the principles that govern the community’s justice judgments, as has 
been discussed previously.248 Criminal law is a special legislative subject, in this regard, for 
ordinary people’s judgments have a strong intuition component in which they may not be fully 
aware themselves. The only reliable way of determining whether a proposed criminal law rule 
will be seen over time by the community as being just when applied in a variety of cases is to 
have social scientists test people’s justice judgments in a controlled way.249 
 A second reform proposal stems from this question: if the legislators knows that the 
proposed rule conflicts with community justice judgments, shouldn’t they be obliged to at least 
explain why they believe the conflict is justified? Again, it would seem to be difficult to argue 
against this point. Once it is clear that there is a social, political, and a crime-control cost to 
criminal law rules that conflict with community judgments, it would seem to follow that some 
special justification is needed for enacting such a conflicting rule. Just having this requirement 
may be enough to deter proposals for rules that conflict. 
 A third proposal would be to create a mechanism to help carry out and monitor these 
legislative obligations: establishment of a standing criminal law reform commission. Some states 
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already have such commissions or bodies that perform this function.250 The commission could 
develop and maintain the expertise and logistical capacity to do the research on community 
views called for by the first proposal. It could also provide or arrange expertise to help the 
legislature analyze and draw conclusions from the results of the studies. What is the nature and 
extent of the conflict? Can the conflict be justified in some way due to special circumstances? 
The commission could help investigate these questions, provide a forum for public discussion of 
the issues, if the legislature thought it appropriate, and could record and advertise the 
legislature’s justification for enacting a conflict rule. A record of these legislative activities could 
be invaluable for subsequent application of such conflict rules by courts, as well as useful in 
future legislative consideration of conflicts. 
 One might think it unlikely that a legislature would be inclined to impose upon itself such 
obligations, or one might think that this or any limitation on the exercise of its power would be 
anathema to a state or federal congress. But criminal justice issues commonly present a special 
situation for legislators. Sometimes they can see for themselves that sharing the rulemaking 
process with others can provide not only a better ultimate result but also provide some level of 
insulation from storms of public criticism. Note, for example, the federal Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, by which Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to which it 
effectively delegated much of its criminal punishment authority.251 
   The three proposals here are minor in comparison. They are less a delegation of 
legislative criminal rulemaking and more an imposition on themselves of an obligation to obtain 
information and explain their decisions, with an independent public body having only the 
authority to make public comment. On balance, the burdens and constraints created by such 
reforms might be viewed as much worth the increased legitimacy and credibility that they could 




 This Article has demonstrated the hidden costs that follow from criminal law rules that 
conflict with community justice judgments: sapped democratic legitimacy, a loss of crime-
control effectiveness, and state-sanctioned injustices. The most salient reasons for the prevalence 
of such laws – legislative mistake, interest group pressure, prioritizing coercive crime-control, 
and legislative preference for criminal law delegation – are understandable, and disappointing, 
but fixable.  
 As to avoiding legislative mistakes, self-interested legislators are presumably interested 
in learning the true beliefs of their constituents. Although politicians will still be presented with 
the inherently inaccurate opinion polls regarding criminal law rules, the more reliable empirical 
studies provide an obvious response when loud but unrepresentative voices demand legislative 
action in conflict with community views.  
 Persuading legislators to stand up to special interest group pressure to adopt conflict rules 
is more complicated. Self-concern may push toward supporting the conflict rule, in order to reap 
the interest group’s proffered rewards, but legislators’ willingness to go along may be 
conditional on their ignorance of true community views. Once the use of reliable empirical 
studies reveals the truth, however, they may be less inclined to grant the special interest request 
because, to do so, breaks faith with their larger constituency. Such a breach can seriously conflict 
with their self-interest in getting reelected by those constituents. In other words, legislators may 
be willing to promote special interests that conflict with community judgments only when that 
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conflict is obscured. A more active program of empirical study is poised to reduce or eliminate 
the existing obfuscation. 
 Prioritizing coercive crime-control as a justification for adopting conflict rules also 
presents a complex problem for legislators. Laws that purport to avoid future crime have great 
appeal. However, the choice becomes less attractive when one considers the social science 
studies that reveal ordinary people’s commitment to doing justice – having criminal liability and 
punishment track blameworthiness proportionality – exceeds their interest in general deterrence 
or incapacitation of the dangerous. Perhaps even more important is the revelation that, as a 
practical matter, promoting the criminal law’s moral credibility may have greater long-term 
crime-control effectiveness that either a program of general deterrence or incapacitation, both of 
which have serious problems and limitations in their implementation.252 The combination of 
scientific proof and common-sense historical examples could be a potent combination in 
convincing legislators to resist the lure of harsh coercive crime control. 
 Finally, as to criminal law delegation, while the incentives may still exist, there is every 
indication that they are seriously diminishing. To the extent that legislators support very broadly 
defined offenses that include criminal conduct of dramatically different seriousness because they 
believe criminal codes cannot articulate meaningful differences, modern codes have shown their 
assumption to be false. Modern American codes now typically contain an enormous number of 
offense grading distinctions.253 And advances in drafting techniques have suggested that such 
nuance can be easily accommodated and even extended.254 
 Nor is it likely that the tolerance of broadly defined offenses will continue. The history of 
criminal law reform in the United States has been one of increasing grading nuance within 
criminal statutes. Although the Model Penal Code drafters in 1962 were content with essentially 
five offense grades255–giving judges (and prosecutors) broad discretion–modern American 
criminal codes typically have more than a dozen offense grades.256 And, while the Model Code 
commonly provided only the minimum requirements for liability for an offense, modern codes, 
as noted above, have introduced an enormous number of grading factors. Indeed, it is this 
demand for recognizing and controlling the most significant distinctions among cases for the 
same offense that has helped generate the modern sentencing guidelines movement. The past 
practice of broad, unstructured legislative delegation seems unlikely to continue unchallenged. 
 The key to avoiding all of these sources of undemocratic crimes–legislative mistake, 
interest group pressure, prioritizing coercive crime-control, and legislative preference for 
criminal law delegation–is legislative education about the resulting conflict with community 
views. Legislators must be shown that these practices create great rifts between the criminal law 
and the deep intuitions of the people governed, thereby generating hidden crime-control and 
justice costs. Our hope is that this Article can help legislators begin a re-examination of these 
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